Proximity-Driven Liability by Smith, Bryant Walker
University of South Carolina 
Scholar Commons 
Faculty Publications Law School 
8-2014 
Proximity-Driven Liability 
Bryant Walker Smith 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/law_facpub 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Proximity-Driven Liability
BRYANT WALKER SMITH*
This Article argues that commercial sellers' growing information about,
access to, and control over their products, product users, and product uses
could significantly expand their point-of-sale and post-sale obligations toward
people endangered by these products. This Article first describes how compa-
nies are embracing new technologies that expand their information, access, and
control, with primary reference to the increasingly automated and connected
motor vehicle. It next analyzes how this proximity to product, user and use
could impact product-related claims for breach of implied warranty, defect in
design or information, post-sale failure to warn or update, and negligent
enabling of a third-party's tortious behavior It finally flips the analysis to
consider how the uncertainty caused in part by changing liability could actually
drive companies to further embrace this proximity.
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INTRODUCTION
Visa, Google, Amazon, Facebook, and FedEx know more about my pur-
chases over the last five years than I do. AT&T can find me-or at least my
phone-whenever it wants.' Microsoft updates my computer's software several
times a month. But what about a manufacturer that discovers a new risk in
something that it made and I bought? The Restatement (Third) of Torts:
Products Liability stresses that warning me could be "difficult" 2 and "daunt-
ing," 3 would be "invariably costly,"4 and, if required for every risk, would
impose "costly and potentially crushing burdens" on sellers.5 This view, which
is based in part on products, practices, and precedents that predate the modem
web, may no longer accurately describe today's burdens of communication. It is
just one example of the potential anachronisms created by the increasing (and
increasingly dynamic) information, access, and control that commercial sellers6
enjoy with respect to their products, product users, and product uses-
relationships encompassed by what I call proximity.
1. For recent confirmation of this, see Scott Shane & Colin Moynihan, Drug Agents Use Vast Phone
Trove, Eclipsing N.S.A. ', N.Y. TIMEs, Sept. 1, 2013, http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/02/us/drug-agents-
use-vast-phone-trove-eclipsing-nsas.html (describing an AT&T database of every call passing through
an AT&T switch since 1987).
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 cmt. e (1998).
3. Id. cmt. a.
4. Id. cmL d.
5. Id. If only marketing departments felt the same way.
6. Throughout this Article, "seller" refers to any of the commercial actors upstream of the consumer,
including retailers, distributors, manufacturers, and suppliers, whether they sell, lease, or potentially
even operate.
PROXIMITY-DRIVEN LIABILITY
This Article argues that growing proximity could significantly expand sellers'
point-of-sale and post-sale obligations toward people endangered by their prod-
ucts. I first describe how companies are embracing new technologies for
information, access, and control, with primary reference to the increasingly
automated and connected motor vehicle.7 I next analyze how this proximity
could impact product-related claims for breach of implied warranty, defect in
design or information, post-sale failure to warn or even update, and negligent
enabling of a third-party's tortious behavior.8 I finally flip my analysis to
consider how the uncertainty caused in part by changing liability could actually
drive companies to further embrace proximity.9
This spiral of liability and proximity could mean that sellers are-perhaps
unwittingly and probably unwillingly-ushering in a new age of product steward-
ship. More than before, companies may have to live with the products that they
have made and marketed.
I. INCREASING PROXIMITY
More than at any point since the advent of industrialization, commercial
sellers today have greater knowledge about, access to, and control over their
products, the people who use them, and the ways in which they are used, even
after those products have left the factory, warehouse, or showroom. In contrast
to a twentieth century that was, from the perspective of a large manufacturer or
merchant, highly impersonal,o the coming decades are likely to feature sellers
wading deep into the vast deltas of well-charted streams of commerce. This Part
briefly describes three overlapping, multidisciplinary aspects of this expanded
pre- and post-sale presence: greater proximity to the product, to the product
user, and to the product use. It then considers all three aspects as they relate to
the modern automotive industry. Finally, it looks ahead to automated motor
vehicles as well as other emerging consumer and industrial products.
A. PROXIMITY TO THE PRODUCT
The proximity between a commercial seller and its product at the point of
sale is manifest: Implicit in the law of warranty is the expectation that a seller
knows what it is selling, and companies have long been liable for defects
7. See infra Part I. I use motor vehicles because of the huge legal and social impact they have had
over the last century, see infra section LD, and because of the technical and commercial changes they
reflect and portend, see infra section I.E.
8. See infra Part 1l.
9. See infra Part III.
10. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 467 (Cal. 1944) (Traynor, J.,
concurring) ("As handicrafts have been replaced by mass production with its great markets and
transportation facilities, the close relationship between the producer and consumer of a product has
been altered."); David G. Owen, The Evolution of Products Liability Law, 26 REv. LmG. 955, 962
(2007) ("As courts began imposing implied warranties of quality on manufacturers in the latter part of
the nineteenth century, manufacturers increasingly were handing over the retail function to third-party
dealers.").
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introduced by their suppliers." Indeed, "control" of a product is generally
assumed to end upon its sale. 12 This section therefore focuses on the expan-
sion of post-sale proximity in two ways: product connectivity and lifecycle
management.
Consumer products are increasingly connected to larger digital networks.
Phones, tablets, gaming systems, and even cars already send and receive in-
formation through cellular, Bluetooth, and Wi-Fi networks.13 Functions like
border processing,14 toll payment,' 5 "medical monitoring, natural event monitor-
ing, object tracking,"' 6 and product quality control,' 7 among others,' 8 already
rely in part on radio frequency identification (RFID).19 An extreme, though not
yet realized, vision of the "Internet of Things" describes a networked world in
which every physical object-from a bolt in a bridge to a cardigan in a
closet-is electronically identifiable and addressable. 2 0 Eventually connecting
these smart products to the Internet is unlikely to overwhelm the latest version
of the Internet's communications protocol (IPv6), which can at least in theory
accommodate 3.4X 10A38 unique addresses 2 '-or roughly one for every atom
in every human on the planet.22
11. Cf Sally H. Clarke, Unmanageable Risks: Macpherson v. Buick and the Emergence of a Mass
Consumer Market, 23 LAw & HisT. REV. 1, 27 (2005) (describing relationship between automaker and
wheels supplier).
12. Cf infra notes 255-63 and accompanying text. Control is a vexing concept. See generally
Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Vehicles Are Probably Legal in the United States, 1 TEX. A&M L.
REv. 411 (2014) [hereinafter Smith, Automated Vehicles]. Because of the potential for confusion,
particularly given the different conceptions of control in engineering and law, the SAE On-Road
Automated Vehicle Standards Committee has at my urging avoided any use of the term "control" in its
draft document defining levels of automation. See Bryant Walker Smith, SAE Levels of Driving
Automation, CTR. FOR INTERNET & Soc'Y (Dec. 18, 2013) [hereinafter Smith, SAE Levels], http://
cyberlaw.stanford.edulloda.
13. See, e.g., Ching-Yao Chan, Connected Vehicles in a Connected World, INT'L SYMP. ON VLSI
DESIGN, AUTOMATION & TEST (VLSI-DAT), Apr. 2011, at 1, 2.
14. See, e.g., Passports Definition, 70 C.F.R. § 51.1 (2013).
15. See Lisa Grossman, New RFID Tag Could Mean the End of Bar Codes, WIRED MAG. (Mar. 26,
2010, 6:11 PM), http://www.wired.com/wiredscience/2010/03/rfid/.
16. Amirhosein Taherkordi et al., Achieving Availability and Reliability in Wireless Sensor Networks
Applications, FIRST INT'L CONFERENCE ON AVAILABILITY, RELIABILITY & SEC. (ARES '06) Apr. 2006, at 1,
1.
17. See id.
18. E.g., Mike Olson, 10 Best Uses for RFID Tags, WIRED MAG. (Feb. 23, 2009), http://archive.
wired.com/techbiz/it/magazine/17-03/stbest.
19. See Kevin Werbach, Sensors and Sensibilities, 28 CARDozo L. REV. 2321, 2330 (2007).
20. ALESSANDRO BASSI ET AL., INTERNET OF THINGS IN 2020: A ROADMAP FOR THE FUTURE 16 (2008),
available at http://www.smart-systems-integration.org/public/intemet-of-things.
21. See, e.g., Sean Captain, Internet Grows by Trillions of Addresses, as IPV6 Rolls Out Worldwide,
TECHNEwsDAILY (June 6, 2012), http://www.foxnews.com/tech/2012/06/06/internet-grows-by-trillions-
addresses-as-ipv6-rolls-out-worldwide/.
22. There are roughly 7 billion humans currently alive, see, e.g., U.S. and World Population Clock,
UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last visited March 1, 2014), and




The companies that make, sell, and support these products are sometimes part
of these networks. Software, which is arguably a product,2 3 is the most obvious
example. The personal computers, cell phones, and other advanced electronic
devices on which this software runs are others. Product connectivity enables
sellers to monitor their products long after the date of sale. It also facilitates
firmware updates, including the over-the-air updates used by cellular service
providers. Apple's 2007 iPhone update notoriously if unintentionally "bricked"
phones that customers had unlocked without authorization.2 4 Amazon.com's
ill-fated 2009 decision to remotely delete the unauthorized digital editions of
some books, including George Orwell's 1984, from customers' Kindle devices
similarly demonstrated the power of access.2 5
Technology is not the only driver of product proximity. A number of related
concepts that fall broadly under the heading "lifecycle management" suggest
that companies have product-specific interests or obligations that continue
beyond the product sale.2 6 For example, the International Organization for
Standardization's functional safety standard for road vehicles considers an
entire "automotive safety lifecycle" that at least cursorily extends through
"operation, service, [and] decommissioning."27 Manufacturers, distributors, and
sellers regularly conduct recalls that are nominally if not actually voluntary. 8
Concerns about electronic waste have led some twenty-five states to pass
takeback laws29 and more than thirty companies to launch voluntary takeback
23. See infra section II.D.
24. Gregg Keizer, Update: Apple Plays Hardball: Upgrade 'Bricks' Unlocked iPhones, COMPUTER-
WORLD, Sept. 27, 2007, http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9039479/UpdateApple-plays-
hardballUpgrade-bricksunlockediPhones. "Bricking" an electronic device means turning it into a
very expensive paperweight. Cf id. (explaining the consequences of a "bricked" iPhone).
25. See Brad Stone, Amazon Erases Orwell Books from Kindle, N.Y. TIMES, July 18, 2009, http://
www.nytimes.com/2009/07/18/technology/companies/18amazon.html. "Amazon effectively acknowl-
edged that the deletions were a bad idea." Id.
26. "X by design"-as in safety by design, privacy by design, security by design, and sustainability
by design-treats certain characteristics of use as essential and integrated elements of the design
process.
27. ISO 26262-7:2011, at v. See generally ISO 26262-7 ("Production and operation").
28. See, e.g., Recalls and Defects, Nxr'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIc SAFETY ADMIN., http://www.nhtsa.gov/
Vehicle+Safety/Recalls+&+Defects (last visited Mar. 1, 2014); Recalls, Market Withdrawals, and
Safety Alerts, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., http://www.fda.gov/safety/recalls/ (last visited Mar. 1, 2014);
Recent Recalls, CONSUMER PROD. SAFETY COMM'N, http://www.cpsc.gov/en/Recalls/ (last visited Mar. 1,
2014).
29. See Legislative Toolkit, ELECTRONICS TAKEBACK COALITION, http://www.electronicstakeback.com/
promote-good-laws/state-legislation-toolkit/ (last visited Sept. 15, 2013). See generally Nicole Buse-
man, Note, A Second-Generation Solution to Electronic Waste: The New York Approach, 37 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. 245, 250 (2012) (discussing how twenty-five states have adopted electronic waste policies
over the last decade); Velissa Chapa, Note, Dying in a Digital Dump: Why Texas Must Improve Its
Electronics Recycling Efforts, 14 TEX. TECH ADMIN. L.J. 173, 174 (2012) (discussing how twenty-five
states have electronic waste laws); Hannah G. Elisha, Note, Addressing the E-Waste Crisis: The Need
for Comprehensive Federal E-Waste Regulation Within the United States, 14 CHAP. L. REv. 195, 215-17
(2010) (discussing the implementation of electronic waste policies across the country).
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programs. 3 0 And some legal scholars have advocated a different form of "prod-
uct stewardship" for pharmaceutical developers, arguing that these companies
should have post-sale duties of research and testing.3 '
Although law is an important and, as this Article argues, growing source of
post-sale duties, 3 2 engineering, economics, and ethics are also powerful motiva-
tors. The user is also central to a seller's considerations-and the subject of the
next section.
B. PROXIMITY TO THE USER
User proximity contemplates pre-sale, point-of-sale, and post-sale relation-
ships between the sellers and the users of a product. Although the person who
actually uses a manufactured item is not necessarily that item's first buyer, or
even any buyer, 3 companies are increasingly able to obtain information about,
access to, and control over buyers as well as users.
Consumer privacy scholars have written extensively about the consumer
data collection that enables savvy companies to know more about an individual
than she knows they know-and, in some cases, more than she even knows
about herself.34 One story tells of an angry father who marched into a Target
store, demanding to know why his teen daughter had received coupons for baby
clothes, only to apologize a few days later when he realized that Target had
surmised his daughter's pregnancy well before he had. Companies may
calibrate the content of a customer interaction based on "the weather, the time
of day or day of the week, and whether a customer is alone or accompanied." 36
Several lending platforms use a loan applicant's specific social media and online
30. See Manufacturer Takeback Programs in the U.S., ELECTRONICS TAKEBACK COALITION, http://
www.electronicstakeback.com/how-to-recycle-electronics/manufacturer-takeback-programs/ (last vis-
ited Sept. 15, 2013).
31. See, e.g., George W. Conk, Punctuated Equilibrium: Why Section 402A Flourished and the Third
Restatement Languished, 26 REv. LITIG. 799, 877-80 (2007). But see Lars Noah, Platitudes About
"Product Stewardship" in Torts: Continuing Drug Research and Education, 15 MICH. TELECOMM. &
TECH. L. REV. 359 (2009) (referencing and critiquing such proposals).
32. See infra Part II.
33. Similarly, a products liability plaintiff is not necessarily a buyer or a user. See infra section II.B.
34. See generally, e.g., Stan Karas, Privacy, Identity, Databases, 52 AM. U. L. REv. 393 (2002)
(discussing various rationales for protecting consumer information); Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, Collateral-
izing Privacy, 78 TuL. L. REV. 553 (2004) (discussing violations of privacy through collateralization of
consumer information); Jeff Sovern, Opting In, Opting Out, or No Options at All: The Fight for Control
of Personal Information, 74 WASH. L. REV. 1033 (1999) (discussing how businesses routinely buy and
sell personal information about consumers); Lior Jacob Strahilevitz, Reputation Nation: Law in an Era
of Ubiquitous Personal Information, 102 Nw. U. L. REV. 1667 (2008) (discussing public information
asymmetries and explaining how it will unsettle existing assumptions about law and public policy);
Eugene Volokh, Tort Law vs. Privacy, 113 COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (discussing which "legal
institutions-juries, judges, or legislatures-should resolve the privacy vs. safety questions that rou-
tinely arise within tort law").
35. See Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 2012, http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html.
36. Thomas H. Davenport et al., Know What Your Customers Want Before They Do, HARV. Bus. REV.,
Dec. 2011, at 2, 6; see also Well-Being Index, GALLUP HEALTHWAYS, http://www.well-beingindex.com
(last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
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spending data, including in one case the payment history of that applicant's
social media contacts, to determine credit risk.3 7 Scores of third parties track
Internet users' web activity through cookies and other digital tools. 3 8
Certain physical devices expand this potential. Apple's iPhone 5s is the latest
product to include a fingerprint scanner.3 9 Google now owns "a small biometric
firm ... that has developed face recognition, video tracking and recognition,
and face-based soft-biometric technologies." 4 0 And Microsoft's Kinect, de-
signed for its Xbox and loved by researchers,4 1 "can monitor users' movements
with a camera that sees in the dark, picks up voice commands with a micro-
phone, and reads your heart rate using infrared cameras that track blood flow
underneath the skin."42 These capabilities exist, but have not been widely
deployed commercially.43
Strikingly, the data that are actually collected about individuals are often un-
available to those same individuals. 4 One journalist astutely noted that her
cellular service provider, electrical utility, and health club all keep detailed
records of her behavior, records that she can only access with a subpoena, in
summary form, and once a year, respectively. 4 5 In contrast, Intel's "data econ-
omy" project "encourage[s] companies to think of consumers as participants in
the information economy, and not just as data-harvesting opportunities."46
37. See Katie Lobosco, Facebook Friends Could Change Your Credit Score, CNNMONEY (Aug. 27,
2013, 11:24 AM ET), http://money.cnn.com/2013/08/26/technology/social/facebook-credit-score.
38. See Omer Tene & Jules Polonetsky, To Track or "Do Not Track": Advancing Transparency and
Individual Control in Online Behavioral Advertising, 13 MINN. J.L. Sci. & TECH. 281, 282-306 (2012).
39. See Andrea Peterson & Hayley Tsukayama, Fingerprint Scanner for iPhone 5s Raises Privacy,
Security Concerns, WASH. POST, Sept. 20, 2013, http://www.washingtonpost.com/business/technology/
fingerprint-scanner-for-iphone-5s-raises-privacy-security-concerns/2013/09/20/0992cbee-222f-11e3-
966c-9c4293c47ebestory.html; see also AMAZON, www.amazon.com (search for "fingerprint scanner")
(returning 534 results, including laptops, time clocks, and locks).
40. Karl Ricanek, Jr. & Chris Boehnen, Facial Analytics: From Big Data to Law Enforcement,
IEEE COMPUTER Soc'Y, Sept. 2012, at 95; see also Evgeny Morozov, Requiem for Our Wonderfully
Inefficient World, SLATE (Apr. 26, 2013), http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/futuretense/2013/04/
senorbaseddynamic-pricing-may.be..efficient but it could create inequality.html (describing vend-
ing machines that adjusted prices based on outside temperature and an in-store kiosk that recom-
mended products based on optimal determination of the shopper's sex and age). Morozov's understand-
able embrace of certain "inefficienc[ies]" of a "dumb" world nonetheless implicitly gives up half the
argument: If costs and benefits are correctly measured within appropriate system boundaries, desirable
outcomes are by definition efficient.
41. Many researchers use Kinect in their research. See, e.g., Alex Teichman et al., Unsupervised
Intrinsic Calibration of Depth Sensors via SLAM, ROBOTICs: SCIENCE AND SYSTEMs, June 2013, available
at www.roboticsproceedings.org/rssO9/p27.pdf.
42. Ryan Gallagher, German Official: Xbox One Spying Capabilities a "Twisted Nightmare," SLATE
(May 28, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/future-tense/2013/05/28/germany-privacy-chief.peter
schaar calls xbox one a twisted nightmare-for.html.
43. See id.




46. Id. (referencing wethedata.com).
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The relational function of "big data"47 extends into relational contracting.4 8
Companies rely on information they collect about and from users for managing
their brands, retaining their customers, preventing legal claims, and developing
products.4 9 Implicit in many of these activities is a long-term view of customer
relationships that is not reducible to discrete transactions governed wholly by
distinct formal contracts.
Nonetheless, formal contracts of adhesion remain a perennial feature of the
consumer experience. End-user license agreements (EULAs) were first used by
software companies to "impose conditions on the licensee (the purchaser) that
[were] not otherwise permissible under federal copyright law."50 These shrink-
wrap licenses migrated online to become the browsewrap licenses5' to which
web users routinely consent. Violation of these online terms of use can arguably
and disturbingly constitute a criminal offense. 5 2 But web users might be for-
given for failing to read all the fine print they encounter: In a 2008 article, two
scholars estimated that reading just the privacy policies of the websites that an
average web user visited in a year would require 244 hours.53
As the phrase "terms of use" suggests, these contractual tools expand proxim-
ity not just to the user, but also to the use, which is the third and final aspect
considered.
C. PROXIMITY TO THE USE
For many of the reasons discussed in the previous two sections, companies
may also have information about, access to, and control over the post-sale uses
of their products. In the words of one scholar, these "tethered appliances" are
"contingent: rented instead of owned, even if one pays up front for them, since
they are subject to instantaneous revision."54 Digital rights management,
well-known in intellectual property law, extends a kind of control to sellers or
47. Karen E.C. Levy, Note, Relational Big Data, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 73, 74 (2013), http://
www.stanfordlawreview.org/online/privacy-and-big-data/relational-big-data (arguing that "data now me-
diate our day-to-day social relationships to an unprecedented degree") (emphasis omitted).
48. Cf Herbert Hovenkamp, The Lw of Vertical Integration and the Business Firm: 1880-1960, 95
IOWA L. REv. 863, 892 (2010) ("A 'relational' contract is one that is open-ended in the sense that it
contemplates an ongoing relationship among the parties, with adjustments in price, quantity, or other
terms that must be made from time to time.").
49. See, e.g., Steven Rosenbush & Michael Totty, How Big Data Is Changing the Whole Equation
for Business, WALL ST. J. (Mar. 10, 2013, 4:00 PM ET), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB 100014241
27887324178904578340071261396666.
50. Lloyd L. Rich, Mass Market Software and the Shrinkwrap License, 23 CoLo. LAW. 1321, 1321
(1994).
51. Cf. Mark A. Lemley, Terms of Use, 91 MINN. L. REV. 459, 459-60 (2006) (discussing these
licenses).
52. See, e.g., Orin S. Kerr, Vagueness Challenges to the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act, 94 MINN.
L. REV. 1561 (2010) (discussing the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act of 1984).
53. See Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor, The Cost of Reading Privacy Policies, 4 I/S:
J.L. & PoL'Y 540, 560 (2008).




licensors of these products that is unfettered by the practical limitations of
copyright and contract.
Equally striking is the complementary embrace of service-based models that
attempt to capture revenue from the ongoing use, rather than (merely) from the
sale of a product. A robust business literature exists on this putative growth56 in
"product service systems" and "servitization," and yet no indexed law review
article has ever used these terms. This may be forgivable, since even the
scholars who deploy the terms most frequently do not entirely agree on what
they mean.57 The literature on these service-oriented models contemplates both
supplementing product sales with related services58 and supplanting product
sales with replacement services,59 a distinction that may be helpful even though
it is muddled by the consideration of time.6 0 The crane industry provides a
useful example: 61 Crane manufacturers might, through vertical integration,
complement their sales with inspection services, ongoing maintenance, equip-
ment upgrades, training, and consultation.6 2 Alternately, rather than sell their
cranes at all, they might lease these products to construction firms or simply
provide hoisting services directly to customers.
Whatever servitization is precisely, "[e]mpirical evidence suggests that glob-
ally one-third of manufacturing firms" are now doing it, "a figure that rises to
almost 60 percent in the United States."63 Microsoft's shift to a subscription
55. See, e.g., Jay P. Kesan & Rajiv C. Shah, Setting Software Defaults: Perspectives from Law,
Computer Science and Behavioral Economics, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 583, 614 (2006); Douglas
Lichtman, How the Law Responds to Self-Help, I J.L. ECON. & POL'Y 215, 238 (2005); Michael J.
Madison, Law as Design: Objects, Concepts, and Digital Things, 56 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 381, 397
(2005).
56. Vertical integration is by no means new, see infra notes 328-31 and accompanying text, and
historical comparison is difficult.
57. See generally Emmanouil Alvizos & Jannis Angelis, What Is Servitization Anyway? (Prod. and
Operations Management Soc'y 21st Annual Conference, May 2010); see also Frank Tietze et al.,
Firms' Transition Towards Green Product Service System Innovators 1-2 (R&D Mgmt. Conference
2011, Accepted Paper, June 2011) (reviewing definitions for product service systems); Arman Avadikyan
& Stephane Lhuillery, Technological Innovation, Organizational Change and Product Related Services
2 (Oct. 29, 2002) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2168370. In fairness,
lack of clarity is occasionally a problem in law as well.
58. See, e.g., Ivanka Visnjic et al., Another Performance Paradox? A Refined View on the Perfor-
mance Impact ofServitization 3 (ESADE, Working Paper No. 231, 2012).
59. See, e.g., Tietze et al., supra note 57, at 2; Frank Tietze & Erik G. Hansen, To Own or Use?
How Product Service Systems Facilitate Eco-Innovation Behavior (Acad. of Mgmt., Meeting Paper,
2013), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract= 224464.
60. Cf Ivanka Visnjic et al., Steering Manufacturing Organizations Towards Open Service Inno-
vation: The Role of the Integrated Performance Measurement System 15 (ESADE, Working Paper
No. 232, 2012) (noting, for example, that the "primary objective" of maintenance, a service, "is
to postpone the purchase of subsequent products").
61. Largely because it has already been analyzed. See generally Atanu Chaudhuri & Aravinthan G,
Capability-Maturity Model for Servitization and Future Research Directions: Perspectives from the
Crane Manufacturing Industry, Paper Presented at the 19th EUROMA and 4th POMS World Confer-
ence (July 2012).
62. Id. at 4-5.
63. Visnjic et al., supra note 58, at 4 (citing a 2008 paper by Andy Neely).
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model for its latest version of Office also reflects this stronger preference for
service over product.64 "Instead of boxed copies that connect to cloud services,"
the company appears to be embracing "a future where users and IT departments
buy subscriptions to cloud services, and get desktop software as part of the
package."65
A shift in focus from sale to use extends the seller's relationship to the user
and to the product. Before turning to the legal implications of this ongoing
relationship, this paper develops a specific product example, namely the motor
vehicles of today and tomorrow.
D. MOTOR VEHICLES TODAY
Motor vehicles exemplify the ongoing evolution of complex durable goods.
They are also one of the most culturally, socially, economically, and legally
significant products of the last hundred years.66 Motor vehicles have literally
and metaphorically reshaped the American landscape. The average American
spends fifteen days in her car each year.6 7 Motor vehicle crashes in the United
States alone kill more than 30,000 people and injure more than a million every
year,6 with a social cost of some $300 billion.69 Over half of the cases in state
64. Adobe is taking a similar approach. See Simon Bisson, Shifting Subscriptions: Microsoft's
Bet-the-Company Strategy for the Future of Software, ZDNET (July 30, 2012, 3:35 GMT), http://www.
zdnet.com/shifting-subscriptions-microsofts-bet-the-company-strategy-for-the-future-of-software-
7000001802/.
65. Id. Two features of this strategy are noteworthy. First, Microsoft has encouraged its resellers to
market these subscriptions by permitting these resellers to directly bill customers for subscription
purchases. Id. Second, whereas users of older boxed versions of Office could generally "reassign [their]
license to a different device any number of times," the end-user license agreement for the newest boxed
version now "permanently assign[s]" the license to the computer on which it is first installed. Gregg
Keizer, Office 2013 Retail Licensing Change Ties Suite to Specific PC Forever, COMPUTERWORLD
(Feb. 15, 2013, 10:28 AM), http://www.computerworld.com/s/article/9236818/Office2013 retail_
licensing-change-ties suitetospecificPCforever (quoting Microsoft's end-user license agreement
for Office Home & Student 2010). Licenses can be reassigned no more than once every 90 days except
in the case of hardware failure. Id.
66. See generally, e.g., JEAN-PIERRE BARDOU ET AL., THE AUTOMOBILE REVOLUTION: THE IMPACT OF AN
INDUSTRY (1982); ROBERT A. CARO, THE POWER BROKER: ROBERT MOSES AND THE FALL OF NEW YORK
(1974); RALPH NADER, UNSAFE AT ANY SPEED: THE DESIGNED-IN DANGERS OF THE AMERICAN AUTOMOBILE
(1965); THAD WILLIAMSON, SPRAWL, JUSTICE, AND CITIZENSHIP: THE CIVIC COSTS OF THE AMERICAN WAY OF
LIFE (2010); Clarke, supra note 11, at 5; Jerry L. Mashaw & David L. Harfst, Regulation and Legal
Culture: The Case of Motor Vehicle Safety, 4 YALE J. ON REG. 257 (1987); Roger I. Roots, The
Orphaned Right: The Right to Travel by Automobile, 1890-1950, 30 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 245, 247
(2005); Jonathan Simon, Driving Governmentality: Automobile Accidents, Insurance, and the Chal-
lenge to Social Order in the Inter-War Years, 1919 to 1941, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 521, 522 (1997);
TRANSFERS: INTERDISC. J. MOBILITY STUD. (every article).
67. See Bryant Walker Smith, Managing Autonomous Transportation Demand, 52 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 1401, 1411 (2012); see also Summary of Travel Trends: Nat'l Household Travel Survey, U.S. DEF.
oF TRANSP. FED. HIGHWAY ADMIN. 30-33 (June 2011), http://nhts.oml.gov/2009/pub/stt.pdf.
68. See Fatality Analysis Reporting System (FARS) Encyclopedia, NAT'L HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY
ADMIN., http://www.fars.nhtsa.dot.gov/Main/index.aspx (last visited Sept. 9, 2013).




and municipal trial courts are for traffic violations, 70 and roughly a third of all
state court civil trials are related to automotive crashes. 7 A wide variety of
court cases have directly involved motor vehicles.7 2 Even a cursory catalogue of
the impacts of this invention would require hundreds of experts and thousands
of pages.
Today's vehicles are highly complex computers on wheels73 with electronics
that account for up to half of production costs. 7 4 A luxury car manufactured in
2009 "probably contains close to 100 million lines of software code" running on
a network comprising up to 100 electronic control units. This network may
include externally oriented sensors-often some combination of camera, radar,
lidar, ultrasound, and GPS-that detect objects and determine position.76
These systems contribute to nearly every aspect of a vehicle's functionality,
including engine control, active safety, comfort, infotainment, and on-board
70. See Robert LaFountain et al., Examining the Work of State Courts: An Analysis of 2009 State
Court Caseloads, NAT'L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS 3 (2011), http://www.courtstatistics.org/flashmicrosites/
csp/images/csp2009.pdf.
71. See Civil Bench and Jury Trials in State Courts, 2005, BUREAU OF STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE 2 (2009), http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/cbjtsc05.pdf. Non-asbestos products liability claims,
which are reported separately and not broken out by type, account for only 1% of state court trials.
See id.
72. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945 (2012); Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler
Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614 (1985); World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S.
286 (1980); Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402 (1971); Morgan v. Virginia,
328 U.S. 373 (1946); Grimshaw v. Ford Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (Ct. App. 1981); Dodge v. Ford
Motor Co., 170 N.W. 668 (Mich. 1919); Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J.
1960); MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
73. See Jim Motavalli, The Dozens of Computers that Make Modern Cars Go (and Stop), N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 5, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/05/technology/05electronics.html. Indeed, "[miost
interesting products that you don't eat come with software," Randal C. Picker, Rewinding Sony: The
Evolving Product, Phoning Home and the Duty of Ongoing Design, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REv. 749, 750
(2005), and automobiles are not particularly edible (with some troubling exceptions, see, e.g., vicked.
vicky, Edible Cars-The Tasty Test Drive, XCITEFUN.NET (Mar. 7, 2011), http://forum.xcitefun.net/edible-
cars-the-tasty-test-drive-t58988.html (depicting several types of edible cars)).
74. See Robert N. Charette, This Car Runs on Code, IEEE SPECTRUM (Feb. 1, 2009), http://spectrum.
ieee.org/green-techladvanced-cars/this-car-runs-on-code. In 2005, electronics accounted for roughly
15% of the total cost (excluding final assembly) for a conventional vehicle and roughly 45% for a
hybrid, which uses particularly complex engine control. Id. These shares were expected to increase
considerably. Id. Notably, the cost just for electronics-related warranty claims in 2002 was roughly
$150 per vehicle. Sharon Arthur et al., Shifting Car Makeup Shakes Up OEM Status Quo: Software
Strength Is Critical, IBM INST. FOR Bus. VALUE 4 (2002), http://www-935.ibm.com/services/id/igs/pdf/
g5 10-1692-00-shifting-car-makeup-shakes-up-oem-status-quo.pdf; Scott Hebner, Smarter Products: The
Building Blocks for a Smarter Planet, IBM (2009), ftp://public.dhe.ibm.com/software/emea/de/rationall
neu/Smarter-productsThe-building-blocks-for_a_smarter planetEN_2009.pdf.
75. Charette, supra note 74. Lines of code is at best an order-of-magnitude proxy for software
complexity. See, e.g., David Auerbach, 5 Million Lines of Obfuscation, SLATE (Oct. 22, 2013),
http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/bitwise/2013/10/ healthcare.gov-problemswhat_5_million-
lines of code really-means.html (criticizing this metric).
76. See Sven A. Beiker, Legal Aspects of Autonomous Driving, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 1145, 1147
(2012). Just as radar stands for "radio detection and ranging," lidar stands for "light detection and
ranging." Lidar, Oxford English Dictionary, 2013.
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diagnostics. Electronic stability control is now federally required. More
advanced driver assistance systems-including adaptive cruise control (which
automatically adjusts speed to maintain a desired following distance), brake
assist (which increases braking pressure in emergencies), automatic emergency
braking (which applies the brakes to avoid or mitigate a collision), blind spot
warning, lane departure warning, collision warning, pedestrian detection, and
automated parallel parking-are already available on some models.
In 2012, Tesla became the first established automaker to provide over-the-air
updates (OTA) of in-vehicle software,8 0 and others are following.8 ' Tesla's first
update made slight changes to the car's dashboard display, radio, and other
aspects of the user experience.82 In contrast, a subsequent update enabled the
electric car to mimic its gasoline-powered rivals by creeping ahead when the
driver removes her foot from the accelerator3-a much more substantial change
related to the physical movement of the automobile.
Even vehicles that are not remotely updatable are increasingly communi-
cating with the outside world.84 Following the launch of OnStar by General
Motors in 1996,85 many other automakers and their affiliates introduced similar
cellular-based in-vehicle telematics systems.86 Current offerings include
"[e]mergency assistance, such as roadside services and crash notification,"
"[m]aintenance services, such as remote diagnostics and service notifications,"
"[s]ecurity and safety services, such as remote access, lock, start, and vehicle
77. See id.
78. See Electronic Stability Control Systems, 49 C.F.R. § 571.126 (2012).
79. See, e.g., Beiker, supra note 76, at 1147-48.
80. See Damon Lavrinc, In Automotive First, Tesla Pushes Over-the-Air Software Patch, WIRED
MAG. (Sept. 24, 2012, 5:54 PM), http://www.wired.com/autopia/2012/09/tesla-over-the-air/. The same
year, Ford mailed some 300,000 USB drives containing software updates to users of its infotain-
ment system. David Zax, A Software Update for Your Car?, MIT TECH. REV. (Mar. 6, 2012), http://
www.technologyreview.com/view/427153/a-software-update-for-your-car/.
81. See Mike Barton, Mercedes Revs mbrace2 with Cloud Updates, WIRED MAO. (Apr. 9, 2012,
3:16 PM), http://www.wired.com/insights/2012/04/mercedes-mbrace2/; Wayne Cunningham, Audi Tells
You Where to Park It, CNET (June 4, 2013, 9:01 PM PDT), http://www.cnet.com/news/audi-tells-you-
where-to-park-it; Doug Newcomb, Sprint Connects with the 2013 Ram Pickup, Dodge Viper, WIRED
MAG. (Aug. 10, 2012, 6:15 AM), http://www.wired.com/autopia/2012/08/sprint-dodge-ram-uconnect/;
Dennis K. Nilsson & Ulf E. Larson, Secure Firmware Updates over the Air in Intelligent Vehicles,
IEEE INr. CONFERENCE ON COMM. WORKSHOPs (2008), http://ieexplore.ieee.org/stamp/stamp.jsparnumber=
04531926.
82. See Lavrinc, supra note 80.
83. See Mark Rechtin, Tesla Nimbly Updates Model S over the Air, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (Jan. 16,
2013, 3:02 PM), http://www.autonews.com/article/20130116/OEM06/130ll9843/tesla-nimbly-updates-
model-s-over-the-air.
84. See Chan, supra note 13; see also Francesca Svarcas, Turning a New LEAF: A Privacy Analysis
of CARWINGS Electric Vehicle Data Collection and Transmission, 29 SANTA CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH
TECH. L.J. 165, 165 (2012). For a list of connectivity systems as of 2011, see Hiro Onishi, Paradigm
Change of Vehicle Cyber Security, INT'L CONFERENCE ON CYBER CONFLICT (2012), www.ccdcoe.org/
publications/2012proceedings/6_2 OnishiParadigmChangeOfVehicleCyber-Security.pdf.
85. For a history of OnStar from 1996 to 2002, see William McCormack & Richard R. Johnson,
General Motors OnStar, Case Study UVA-M-0659, Univ. of Va. Darden Sch. of Bus. (2002).
86. See Chan, supra note 13.
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locator and tracking," "[i]nfotainment, such as internet radio, RSS feed reader,
TV and video streaming," and "[nlavigation services, such as dynamic point of
interests and real time traffic."
The information generated by all of these systems can total some fifteen
gigabytes per hour, of which only a tiny portion is stored or transmitted. Event
data recorders89 (and possibly other on-board electronic components 90 ) retain
five or more seconds of certain airbag, seatbelt, speed, roll, engine, occupant,
and other crash-relevant data.91 Increasingly, manufacturers and others92 are
also collecting these data, sometimes in real time. For example, Tesla's "telemat-
ics services subscription agreement," which is strikingly similar to Nissan' S, 93
explains that the company may obtain
(x) information about the vehicle and its operation, including without limita-
tion, vehicle identification number, location information, speed and distance
information, battery use management information, battery charging history,
battery deterioration information, electrical system functions, software ver-
sion information, and other data to assist in identifying and analyzing the
performance of your Tesla EV; (y) information about your use of the Services;
and (z) data about accidents involving your Tesla EV (for example, the
deployment of air bags).94
87. Id. This cellular connectivity should be distinguished from dedicated short-range communica-
tion (DSRC) in the 5.9 GHz band. Unlike the technologies and applications discussed in this section,
DSRC has yet to be commercially deployed and, at this point, appears to hinge largely on regulatory
action by the Department of Transportation, and, arguably, inaction by the Federal Communications
Commission. The Real "Car Talk"-Vehicles that Can Communicate with Each Other, ITS AMERICA,
http://www.itsa.org/industryforums/connectedvehicle (last visited Sept. 15, 2013). Its widespread adop-
tion could one day foster the kinds of safety-critical applications that require low latency communica-
tion. See Dorothy J. Glancy, Privacy in Autonomous Vehicles, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1171, 1178
(2012); Chan, supra note 13, at 2. However, conflating connected vehicles and DSRC obscures the
rapidly increasing connectivity of today's fleet.
88. See Frank Markus, Your Car's Contribution to the "Big Data" Cloud, MOTOR TREND BLOGS
(Jul. 25, 2013), http://blogs.motortrend.comlyour-cars-contribution-to-the-big-data-cloud-29837.html.
89. See Chris Woodyard & Jayne O'Donnell, Your Car May Be Invading Your Privacy, USA TODAY
(Mar. 25, 2013, 11:45 AM), http://www.usatoday.com/story/money/cars/2013/03/24/car-spying-edr-data-
privacy/1991751/.
90. See, e.g., NISSAN LEAF CUSTOMER DISCLOSURE FORM 3 (3rd ver. 2012), https://owners.nissanusa.
com/content/techpub/ManualsAndGuides/NissanLEAF/2013/2013-NissanLEAF-Customer-Disclosure-
Form.pdf; cf Joe T. Correia et al., Utilizing Data from Automotive Event Data Recorders 4-6 (Pro-
ceedings of the Can. Multidisciplinary Rd. Safety Conference XII, June 2001).
91. See Event Data Recorders, 77 Fed. Reg. 47,552, 47,556 (Aug. 9, 2012). EDRs may soon be
required in all new cars. Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standards; Event Data Recorders, 77 Fed. Reg.
74,144-01 (proposed Dec. 13, 2012). Currently, manufacturers of light vehicles may choose to install
EDRs, which must nonetheless meet specific requirements. Event Data Recorders: Application, 49
C.F.R. § 563.3; see also, e.g., Andrew Askland, The Double Edged Sword That Is the Event Data
Recorder, 25 TEMP. J. Sci. TECH. & ENVTL. L. 1 (2006); Aleecia M. McDonald & Lorrie Faith Cranor,
How Technology Drives Vehicular Privacy, 2 I/S: J.L. & PoL'Y 981, 985-91 (2006).
92. See, e.g., Leslie Scism, State Farm Is There: As You Drive, WALL ST. J. (Aug. 4, 2013), http://
online.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424127887323420604578647950497541958.html.
93. See generally Svarcas, supra note 84.
94. TESLA TELEMATICS SERVICES SUBSCRIPTION AGREEMENT GENERAL SERVICES TERMS AND CONDITIONS
1 8 (Aug. 29, 2013) (on file with author) (graciously provided by Steven Maifert, Tesla customer).
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The customer "owns" these data95 but "grant[s] to Tesla a worldwide, royalty-
free, fully paid, transferable, assignable, sublicensable (through multiple tiers),
perpetual license to collect, analyze and use" them.9 6 These data may help the
company to check, maintain, analyze the performance of, and help in the main-
tenance of the vehicle; "research, evaluate and improve" its technology; "com-
ply with the law and any and all legal requirements," including valid enforce-
ment requests and orders; "protect the rights, property, or safety of' the company,
the customer, or others; and "perform market research for Tesla's own pur-
poses," a list that "is not meant to be exhaustive."97
The broader manufacturer-user relationship, which has long included data
collection,9 8 is complex. By law and practice, consumer sales of new automo-
biles in the United States typically occur through independent dealers. When
this model emerged in the early 1900s, it enabled the nascent automotive
industry to expand rapidly and to shift certain risks,99 particularly since lack of
privity between plaintiff and defendant could still defeat a product defect
claim.'o The dealer model outlived the privity requirement and, by the 1950s,
had been codified in law.'0o
Manufacturers nonetheless play a significant role in putting their vehicles in
the hands of consumers. Some automakers have their own financing arms, such
95. Id. I 11. Some states already specify the owner of certain vehicle data. Privacy of Data from
Event Data Recorders: State Statutes, NAT'L CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/
issues-research/telecom/privacy-of-data-from-event-data-recorders.aspx (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
96. TESLA TELEMATICS SERVICES SUBSCRIPTION AGREEMENT, supra note 94, 11.
97. Id. [ 9. It is, however, somewhat exhausting. Tesla also used these data in an effort to rebut a
negative review in the N.Y. Times. Elon Musk, A Most Peculiar Test Drive, TESLA BLOG (Feb. 13,
2013), http://www.teslamotors.com/blog/most-peculiar-test-drive.
98. See Clarke, supra note 11, at 20 ("Testifying in MacPherson's trial, Alanson P. Brush, a GM
engineer, was asked how he determined a part's durability. 'The most satisfactory information that we
can have, in fact the only means to the designer,' he stated, 'is to use the customers, that is to go over
the complaint correspondence. That is the most satisfactory information a designer can have."').
99. See BILL CANIS & MICHAELA D. PLATZER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40712, U.S. MOTOR VEHICLE
INDUSTRY RESTRUCTURING AND DEALERSHIP TERMINATIONs 2 (2009).
100. See Clarke, supra note 11, at 20-21 (arguing that, in contrast to other high-tech manufac-
turers that had opted to vertically integrate sales and distribution, automakers "placed concerns about
liability for defects ahead of gains in efficiency" by selling through dealers). This early history is not
entirely clear. Compare Kyle Graham, Of Frightened Horses and Autonomous Vehicles: Tort Law and
Its Assimilation of Innovations, 52 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 1241, 1245 (2012), with Lane Kenworthy et al.,
"The More Things Change.. .": Business Litigation and Governance in the American Automobile
Industry, 21 LAw & Soc. INQUIRY 631, 657-58 (1996).
101. See CANIS & PLATZER, supra note 99, at 15-19; Kenworthy et al., supra note 100, at 657-65;
J. Patrick Martin, Comment, The Judicial Treatment of the Automobile Dealer Franchise Act, 62 MICH.
L. REV. 310, 310-13 (1963); Craig Trudell & Christie Smythe, U.S. Dealer Group Seeks Tesla Meeting
on Retail Plans, BLOOMBERG (Oct. 24, 2012, 3:02 PM CT), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-23/
dealer-group-leaving-tesla-retail-challenge-to-states.html; Thomas B. Leary, Former Commissioner,
Fed. Trade Comm'n, State Auto Dealer Regulation: One Man's Preliminary View, Address at Interna-
tional Franchise Association 34*h Annual Legal Symposium (May 8, 2001), available at http://www.
ftc.gov/public-statements/2001/05/state-auto-dealer-redulation-one-mans-preliminary-view. Proponents
of these laws argued that, in contrast with large automakers, "local dealers might have greater
sensitivity to local consumer preferences and provide better overall service." Id.
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as Ford Motor Credit and Toyota Financial Services, that provide loans to
consumers and dealers. 0 2 Vehicle leases accounted for about 20% of new
vehicle transactions in the last decade,10 3 and automakers, through their subsid-
iaries, held nearly half of that market as of 2000.'04
Tesla has challenged the dealer model by selling its cars directly to consum-
ers on the web and through company-owned showrooms. 05 It has been denied
dealership licenses in at least two states because of its status as a manufac-
turer, 10 6 lobbied for or against several pertinent state bills,' 0 7 and (successfully)
faced a court challenge in New York.'08
Daimler, which makes Mercedes-Benz vehicles, has gone further by launch-
ing Car2Go, a carsharing service that rents cars by the minute for one-way,
point-to-point trips.1 09 The involvement of automakers in the rental industry is
not entirely novel; Ford, for example, controlled Hertz from 1987 to 2005.'10
However, companies like Car2Go and its rival ZipCar "offer[] the functional
value of urban mobility to their users""1' in a way that competes more directly
with a model of individual automobile ownership.
102. See CANIS & PLATZER, supra note 99, at 13. GMAC, however, is now largely independent of
General Motors, id., and called Ally Financial. Our History, ALLY FINANCIAL, http://www.ally.com/about/
company-structure/history (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
103. See BUREAU OF TRANSP. STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP. NAT'L TRANSP. STATISTICS Table 1-17
(2012), available at http://www.rita.dot.gov/bts/sites/rita.dot.gov.bts/files/publications/national
transportation statistics/html/table_01_17.html. See generally Thomas B. Hudson & Daniel J. Laudi-
cina, Recent Developments in Motor Vehicle Leasing and Litigation, 59 Bus. LAW. 1145 (2004).
104. See J. Lamar Pierce, Manufacturer Lease Pricing and Adverse Selection 5 (Oct. 8, 2007)
(unpublished manuscript), available at http://ssm.com/abstract= 1157086. Tesla recently instituted a
functionally similar buyback program for its vehicles. Matthew Yglesias, Tesla s New Buyback Scheme-A
Lease with Tax Arbitrage, SLATE (Apr. 2, 2013), http://www.slate.com/blogs/moneybox/2013/04/02/
tesla.buyback schemeit s like_a_lease but withtaxarbitrage.html.
105. See, e.g., Buy, TESLA MOTORs, http://www.teslamotors.com/buy/showroom (last visited Sept. 15,
2013); Tesla Motors Model S Design Studio, TESLA MOTORS, http://www.teslamotors.com/models/design
(last visited Sept. 15, 2013); Stores, Galleries & Service Centers, TEsLA MOTORS, http://www.teslamotors.
com/findus (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
106. See Ken Yeung, Tesla Motors Denied Virginia Dealership License, but Sees Hope in Battle with
Texas to Sell in State, THE NExT WEB (Apr. 24, 2013), http://thenextweb.com/insider/2013/04/24/tesla-
motors-denied-virginia-dealership-license-but-sees-hope-in-battle-with-texas-to-sell-in-state.
107. See Amy Wilson, Tesla Loses Its Battle to Sell Directly in Texas, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS (June 3,
2013), http://www.autonews.com/article/20130603/RETAILO7/306039966/tesla-loses-its-battle-to-sell-
directly-in-texas.
108. See, e.g., Greater New York Auto. Dealers Ass'n v. Dep't of Motor Vehicles, 969 N.Y.S.2d 721,
882 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2013) (dismissing the action for lack of standing).
109. See Stephanie Steinberg & Bill Vlasic, Car-Sharing Services Grow, and Expand Options,
N.Y. TIMEs (Jan. 26, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/01/26/business/car-sharing-services-grow-and-
expand-options.html.
110. See About Hertz, HERTZ, http://www.hertz.com/rentacar/abouthertz/index.jsp?targetPage=
CorporateProfile.jsp&c= aboutHertzHistoryView (last visited Sept. 10, 2013).
111. Tietze et al., supra note 57, at 6.
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E. MOTOR VEHICLES TOMORROW
Vehicle automation is likely to increase dramatically over the coming decade.
Automated research vehicles are already being regularly tested and demon-
strated on public roads around the world, and several companies have declared
their intention to bring some kind of "autonomous" or "self-driving" automobile
to market by 2020.112 Four states plus the District of Columbia have enacted
autonomous driving laws,' 13 and the National Highway Traffic Safety Adminis-
tration has released a preliminary research and policy statement.114
The technologies that emerge in the coming years will fall along a spectrum
of automation.' 15 Automakers are likely to continue building on the advanced
driver assistance systems already found in some vehicles today.1 16 In contrast to
these all-purpose cars, specialty vehicles-such as low-speed, low-mass, geo-
graphically restricted shuttles that circulate on a public or private campus-may
become truly "driverless" much more quickly. Pilot projects involving these
vehicles may also blur the statutory"' line between research and development
testing and general operation.
Automated vehicles will generate and require more data than today's cars
produce or consume. Like the production vehicles described above," 8 today's
research systems use some combination of external sensors. Many of these
systems also rely on detailed and up-to-date roadway maps to assist in naviga-
tion. Others, particularly vehicles that are arranged in closely spaced and tightly
coordinated platoons, 1 9 use low-latency wireless technologies for communica-
112. See, e.g., Tom Krisher, GM Says Almost-Driverless Cars Coming by 2020, ASSOCIATED PRESS
(Aug. 28, 2013, 4:23 PM EDT), http://bigstory.ap.org/article/gm-says-almost-driverless-cars-coming-
2020; Press Release, Nissan, Nissan Announces Unprecedented Autonomous Drive Benchmarks,
(Aug. 27, 2013), http://nissannews.com/en-US/nissan/usa/releases/nissan-announces-unprecedented-
autonomous-drive-benchmarks; Joseph B. White, Mercedes Makes Driverless Ride, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 10,
2013), http://online.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424127887324549004579065541926070378.
113. See Gabriel Weiner & Bryant Walker Smith, Automated Driving: Legislative and Regula-
tory Action, http://cyberlaw.stanford.edulwiki/index.php/AutomatedDriving: Legislative-and_
RegulatoryAction (last visited Sept. 15, 2013); see also Smith, Automated Vehicles, supra note 12, at
500-08.
114. See NATIONAL HIGHWAY TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMINISTRATION, PRELIMINARY STATEMENT OF POLICY
CONCERNING AUToMATED VEHICLES (2013), available at http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/
pdf/AutomatedVehiclesPolicy.pdf.http://www.nhtsa.gov/staticfiles/rulemaking/pdf/Automated Vehicles
Policy.pdf.
115. See, e.g., id. at 4-5; Smith, Automated Vehicles, supra note 12, at 419-24; SAE On-Road
Automated Vehicle Standards (ORAVS) Committee, Open Meeting at Stanford University: Challenges
and Opportunities of Road Vehicle Automation Program (July 15, 2013); Smith, SAE Levels, supra note
12.
116. See supra section I.D.
117. See Smith, Automated Vehicles, supra note 12, at 508-16.
118. See supra section I.D.
119. See Tom Robinson & Eric Chan, Operating Platoons on Public Motorways: An Introduction to




tion among nearby vehicles.120 Integration of these vehicle-to-vehicle (V2V)
or even vehicle-to-infrastructure (V21) communication technologies into the
broader fleet could significantly increase the data transmitted to and from motor
vehicles.121
This increased connectivity could potentially "open[] a currently untapped
treasure chest of new profit pools, and completely new service and pricing
options for automotive manufacturers."12 2 It may also facilitate new, opportuni-
ties (and challenges) for insurers, including highly personalized or pay-as-you-
drive insurance.123 The combination of automation and connectivity could
ultimately produce all kinds of new products and services, from rental cars that
reposition themselves to robotic taxis and trucks to on-demand shuttles extend-
ing the reach of mass transit.124
F. OTHER EMERGING PRODUCTS
While important,125 motor vehicles are not wholly unique, and automation
and connectivity may revolutionize many other products and services as well.
Robots have long been present in industrial applicationsl26 and are making
inroads into institutions like hospitals.12 7 Personal service systems, exoskel-
etons,128 and medical devices may extend robotics even further into the home,
which itself is already becoming smarter and more connected.129 Smart devices
like phones, watches, and glasses will increasingly assist humans in making
split-second decisions that are more important and immediate than simply
which highway exit to take. Commercial aircrafts are already sophisticated
computers, and civilian drone technologies are advancing.13 0 Even basic goods
may one day be linked to each other and to the wider world.13 '
120. Chan, supra note 13.
121. See supra note 87.
122. Andreas Mai & Dirk Schlesinger, Connected Vehicles: From Building Cars to Selling Personal
Travel Time Well-Spent, Cisco INTERNET BUSINESS SOLUTIONS GROUP 5 (2011), http://www.cisco.com/web/
about/ac79/docs/mfg/Connected-VehiclesAutomotive.pdf.
123. Quentin Hardy, Car Insurance by the Mile, N.Y. TIMES Brrs (Dec. 5, 2012, 9:00 AM), http://
bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/12/05/car-insurance-gets-personal.
124. See, e.g., AUTONOMOUS TAXI, http://autonomos.inf.fu-berlin.de/technology/made-germany/
autonomous-taxi (last visited Sept. 15, 2013). This is a different "last-mile problem" than the one noted
below. See infra note 218 and accompanying text.
125. See supra section I.D.
126. Stephen S. Wu, Risk Management in Commercializing Robots 1 (We Robot Conference,
Stanford Univ., April 3, 2013), http://conferences.law.stanford.eduL/werobot/wp-content/uploads/sites/
29/2013/04/Risk-Management-in-Commercializing-Robotics.pdf.
127. Scott Martin, Paging R2-D2 to the Hospital ICU, USA TODAY (May 23, 2013), http://www.
usatoday.com/story/tech/2013/05/23/paging-r2-d2-to-the-hospital-icu/2155381/.
128. Press Release, Nat'l Inst. of Advanced Indus. Sci. & Tech. (Sept. 9, 2013), http://www.aist.go.jp/
aist j/press_ release/pr2013/pr20130904/pr20130904.html.
129. See BASSI ET AL., supra note 20, at 18-19.
130. Nova: Rise of the Drones (PBS television broadcast Jan. 23, 2013), transcript available at
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/military/rise-of-the-drones.html.
131. See supra section I.A.
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In short, increasing proximity could characterize an increasing number of
products that touch an increasing swath of ordinary life. The next Part considers
how this proximity could affect liability for these products.
II. PROXIMITY AS A DRIVER OF LIABILITY
This Part argues that the increasingly proximate seller may find that its duties
expand along with its information, access, and control. After examining duty
generally and relationally, this Part analyzes the impact of proximity on five
potential substantive bases for liability: the implied warranty of fitness for a
particular purpose, design and warning defects, post-sale warnings, post-sale
updates, and negligent enabling.
A. DUTY GENERALLY
This Article uses the term "duty" to broadly describe "who owes whom
what."l 32 The "who" in this formulation is the seller, who may have obligations
grounded in negligence, warranty, or strict products liability. The "whom" is
the person or class of persons to whom that seller owes those obligations and
with whom the question of "relational duty" is concerned. The "what" is the
content of those obligations. In grossly generalized terms, a seller has substan-
tive duties: to market only products that conform to specifications, representa-
tions, and warranties;' 33 to market only products that are as safe as reasonably
possible for foreseeable uses and that include reasonable warnings and instruc-
tions as to their proper use; 134 and to reasonably facilitate the reasonably safe
use of its products. 3 5
My discussion of substantive duty necessarily turns to the meaning of
reasonableness. The boundary between the existence of a duty and the breach of
that duty is nebulous, and some notion of reasonableness guides judges in
determining duty as much as it guides juries in determining breach. 3 6 For
judges, "whether a duty exists is a question of fairness that involves a weighing
of the nature of the risk, the magnitude of the burden of guarding against the
132. This formulation is adapted from a description of duty as a "bifurcated element" comprising
both a "duty to whom" and a "duty to do what." Alani Golanski, Paradigm Shifts in Products Liability
and Negligence, 71 U. Prrr. L. REV. 673, 684 (2010). Since different duties attach to different actors, I
have also expressly specified the "duty of whom." This addition comports with Professor Golanski's
argument that the distinction between regular and intermittent sellers, RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs:
PRODS. LIAB. §§ 1, 20 (1998), belongs under duty rather than proximate cause. Alani Golanski, A New
Look at Duty in Tort Law: Rehabilitating Foreseeability and Related Themes, 75 ALE. L. REv. 227, 265
(2012).
133. See U.C.C. § 2-313 (1977); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. §§ 1-2 (1998).
134. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODS. LIAB. §9 (1998).
135. Cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PHYs. & EMoT. HARM §§ 6, 19 (2010); RESTATEMENT (THIRD)
OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. §§ 10-11 (1998).
136. See, e.g., W. Jonathan Cardi, Purging Foreseeability: The New Vision of Duty and Judicial
Power in the Proposed Restatement (Third) of Torts, 58 VAND. L. REv. 739, 743-67 (2005) (discussing
the role of foreseeability in duty, breach, and proximate cause).
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risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution."' 3 7 For juries, whether that
duty has been breached is similarly (assumed to be) a question about "how a
person who bore both the costs and benefits of care would have behaved."' 3 8 By
reducing the burdens of protective action, proximity lowers the barriers to
affirmative determinations of both duty and breach.
The largely steadfast refusal of courts to recognize an affirmative "duty to
rescue" between strangers is perhaps the relational exception that proves the
rule: No matter how easy or morally advisable it would be, a person has no
legal obligation to save the life of a stranger whom she has not imperiled.' 3 9 But
as the next section argues, proximity may shorten, if not topple, the hurdle of
relational duty.
B. RELATIONAL DUTY
The position of the current Restatement (Third) of Torts that "[a]n actor
ordinarily has a duty to exercise reasonable care when the actor's conduct
creates a risk of physical harm" 4 0 is consistent with an arguable "default duty
of care" that some scholars believe was, until the Industrial Revolution, "always
presumed to exist" and "never explicitly discussed or challenged when tort
liability was imposed." 141 In what may have been an effort to promote industry,
nineteenth century courts began to expressly limit liability through formal
no-duty rules like the privity requirement, most famously in Winterbottom v.
Wright.14 2 This particular requirement, which was subject to exceptions 4 3 and
had dubious application to manufacturing defects,'" was eventually abolished
at least for bodily injury,14 5 but the relational conception of duty survived as a
limit on liability.14 6 Indeed, Judge Cardozo authored both MacPherson v. Buick
137. Doe v. Grosvenor Props. (Hawaii) Ltd., 829 P.2d 512, 515 (Haw. 1992); see also, e.g., Goldberg
v. Hous. Auth. of Newark, 186 A.2d 291, 293 (N.J. 1962) ("Whether a Duty exists is ultimately a
question of fairness. The inquiry involves a weighing of the relationship of the parties, the nature of the
risk, and the public interest in the proposed solution.").
138. Stephen G. Gilles, The Invisible Hand Formula, 80 VA. L. REV. 1015, 1019 (1994) (analyzing
the discrepancy between this black letter law and typical jury instructions).
139. See generally, e.g., Marin Roger Scordato, Understanding the Absence of a Duty to Reasonably
Rescue in American Tort Law, 82 TUL. L. REv. 1447, 1459 (2008) (describing the lack of an affirmative
duty to rescue a stranger as a "long-established feature of American tort law"). But see, e.g., Tarasoff v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 436 (Cal. 1976) (noting how a special relationship between
the defendant and the tortfeasor may create an affirmative duty).
140. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: PHYs. & EMoT. HARM § 7(a) (2010).
141. W. Jonathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REv. 671, 700 (2008). But
see, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of MacPherson, 146 U. PA. L. REv.
1733, 1761 n.104 (1998).
142. Cardi & Green, supra note 141, at 699; Owen, supra note 10, at 960.
143. Owen, supra note 10, at 962.
144. Graham, supra note 100, at 1245-46.
145. See, e.g., MacPherson v. Buick Motor Co., Ill N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916); Henningsen v.
Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 161 A.2d 69 (N.J. 1960); Adams v. Buffalo Forge Co., 443 A.2d 932 (Me.
1982); Donoghue v. Stevenson, [1932] A.C. 562 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Scot.); see also David F.
Tavella, Is Privity Dead? Should It Be?, 8 N.Y.U. J.L. & Bus. 505 (2012).
146. E.g., RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: PHYS. & EMoT. HARM §§ 6 cmt. a, 7(b) (2010); Joseph W.
Little, Palsgraf Revisited (Again), 6 PIERCE L. REv. 75, 86-87 (2007).
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Motor Co.,1 4 7 repudiating the privity requirement, and Palsgraf v. Long Island
R.R. Co.,148 restricting the duty of care to foreseeable victims. Given the
longstanding dominance of Cardozo's view,14 9 the new Restatement's embrace
of a more universal concept of duty has led to vigorous debate focused on
foreseeability 50-and a fresh round of regrettable war metaphors. 5 1
Even in the formal law of warranty, foreseeability is now more central than
privity. The Uniform Commercial Code offers three alternative rules regarding
third parties "who may reasonably be expected to use, consume or be affected
by" a product that is subject to an express or implied warranty.152 Two of these
alternatives wholly dispense with any privity requirement in cases of physical
injury, and although the third, which has been adopted by a majority of states,15 3
textually extends only to the product buyer's family and guests,15 4 some courts
have interpreted it to include even employees or bystanders. 5 5
The implications of increasing proximity, itself a relational concept, for
relational duty are twofold. First, more victims and classes of victims will be
foreseeable. On an expansive view of foreseeability, "unexpected consequences
of new science and technology may be viewed in a sense as more and more
foreseeable, not less."15 6 But even on a specific level, increased flow of informa-
147. 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
148. 162 N.E. 99 (N.Y. 1928).
149. See Little, supra note 146, at 81. Wisconsin, however, "continually states that it has adopted
[Judge Andrew's] 'duty-to-one, duty-to-all the world' view." Id. at 81-82.
150. See, e.g., Cardi & Green, supra note 141 at 722-26; Little, supra note 146, at 84-88. See
generally Golanski, A New Look at Duty in Tort Law, supra note 132.
151. Judge Cardozo reconnoitered the "assault upon the citadel of privity," Ultramares Corp. v.
Touche, 174 N.E. 441, 445 (N.Y. 1931), and Dean Prosser launched a linguistic barrage, see William L.
Prosser, The Assault upon the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 69 YALE L.J. 1099 (1960);
William L. Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REV. 791
(1966); Christopher J. Robinette, The Prosser Notebook: Classroom as Biography and Intellectual
History, 2010 U. ILL. L. REv. 577, 587 n.101, 596 (2010) ("Prosser, extending the analogy that torts is a
'battlefield of social theory,' stated that one can cover a war from afar, discussing the moves of both
sides, or as a war correspondent attached to one army only."), but they were hardly alone in the tort
trenches, see, e.g., Laurence H. Eldredge, Book Review, 53 COLUM. L. REv. 588, 588 (1953) (referring
to "the senior teachers of torts" as "the experienced old war-horses"). More recent correspondents have
moved beyond mere forts and fields. See, e.g., Cardi & Green, supra note 141; Golanski, A New Look
at Duty in Tort Law, supra note 132; Ellen Wertheimer, Unknowable Dangers and the Death of Strict
Products Liability: The Empire Strikes Back, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 1183 (1992); Benjamin C. Zipursky,
Richard Epstein and the Cold War in Torts, 3 J. Tolr L. 5 (2010). Fortunately, "Call of Duty,"
"Breaching the Front Lines of Reasonable Care," and "Foreseeability in the Fog of the Tort War" have
yet to be commandeered as titles for law review articles.
152. U.C.C. § 2-318 (1966).
153. See Jennifer Camero, Two Too Many: Third Party Beneficiaries of Warranties Under the
Uniform Commercial Code, 86 ST. JOHN's L. REV. 1, 10 (2012).
154. See U.C.C. § 2-318. But compare id. § 2-318 cmt. 3 ("[T]he section in this form is neutral and
is not intended to enlarge or restrict the developing case law. . . ."), with id. § 1-103 cmt. 2 ("[W]hile prin-
ciples of common law and equity may supplement provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, they
may not be used to supplant its provisions, or the purposes and policies those provisions reflect . . .
155. See Camero, supra note 153, at 21-23.
156. David G. Owen, Bending Nature, Bending Lw, 62 FLA. L. REv. 569, 609 (2010) ("The Paradox
of Foreseeable Unforeseeability"). I would add one note of caution to this fine article, namely that a
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tion, perhaps in real time, will render wholly expectable much of what was
previously unexpected, if not at the time of system design then at least before
the pertinent transaction or injurious incident. An aerial drone manufacturer
might know from GPS data that one of its planes regularly passes over a school.
An online retailer might suspect from sales data that the customer buying paint
thinner is in the midst of a complicated pregnancy. The supplier of digital maps
for automated vehicles may be able to discern from those very maps that
children on one block have constructed a zipline at truck level over the street.
Second, proximity will give rise to the kinds of special relationships that
continue to matter in law. Subscription plans, end-user license agreements, and
online terms and conditions will create a new privity between customers and
particular companies upstream. Networked systems that rely in part on the
integrity of individual agents-vehicle-to-vehicle communication of safety-
critical messages or crowdsourced correction of roadway maps, for example-
will create new dependencies among previously autonomous actors. Some
companies may find they have become common carriers in the eyes of the
law'5 or that the actions of their autonomous systems, while not necessarily
tortious, have nonetheless created affirmative duties to others.' 58 One might
even ask whether a company that profits from the data it collects from its
customers has any reciprocal obligation to use those data to mitigate imminent
harms to those customers that only it can predict.159 To put the question in the
extreme: To whom does duty extend in a world with no true strangers?
Even the persistent bystander might find some recourse in the special relation-
ships of others. 60 As an initial matter, the reasons for abolishing a privity
requirement would also tend to support a broad duty to bystanders, who are the
least able to make decisions about or benefit from the product ultimately
involved in their injury.161 Accordingly, it is not clear why a seller should be
able to wholly disclaim an implied warranty that extends to third parties.162
Similarly, implicitly asking a consumer to decide what level of safety to afford
century of polluting our environments and bodies demonstrates that the introduction of poorly under-
stood risk is hardly a new phenomenon.
157. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHys. & EMoT. HARM § 40 (2012).
158. See id. § 39.
159. Cf Volokh, supra note 34, at 14 (discussing when a duty to disclose information learned about
others may exist).
160. The notion that the special relationship of two parties creates a duty to a third is not new. See,
e.g., Robert L. Rabin, Enabling Torts, 49 DEPAUL L. REv. 435, 442 (1999) (discussing Tarasoff v.
Regents of the Univ. of Cal., "in which a therapist was held to have owed a duty to warn a victim of his
patient's violence-violence based on intentions that had been revealed to the therapist" 55 1 P.2d 334
(Cal. 1976)).
161. Cf A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Uneasy Case for Product Liability, 123 HARV.
L. REv. 1437, 1491 (2010) ("Both because of the ineffectiveness of market forces in creating safety and
because of the need for product prices to reflect risk when victims are strangers, the rationale for
liability is stronger in that case than when victims are customers.").
162. It is important to distinguish between wholly disclaiming an implied warranty, see U.C.C.
§ 2-316, and excluding only nonbuyers from the protections of that warranty, see id. § 2-318. Courts
generally view a third party's warranty rights as derivative of, and hence no greater than, those of the
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to strangers is somewhat perverse, especially in contexts like car sales, where
the interests of the car buyer may diverge from those of the bicyclist with
whom she shares the road. Moreover, a company that knowingly facilitates
misconduct by its customers may have a duty to those who are harmed by that
misconduct' 6 3-though it may also have potentially conflicting obligations to
its customers with respect to their data.'64
In other words, the combination of a legal pull toward a "duty to all" and a
technological push through "data on all" means that an inquiry into the relation-
ships among parties is increasingly likely to have an expansive rather than
restrictive effect on relational duty. The next section considers the substantive
content of this broader relational duty.
C. IMPLIED WARRANTY OF FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE
As the Uniform Commercial Code provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless
[properly] excluded or modified ... an implied warranty that the goods shall
be fit for such purpose.' 6 5
This implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose can usually, though
not always, be easily disclaimed. 16 6 When it is not, an injured buyer's success
depends in part on what the seller knows or should know-and as the preceding
discussion suggests, some sellers now know a great deal about their customers. 67
Consider three grocery shoppers, each of whom has a child with celiac
disease. The first shopper anonymously and without explanation picks up
canned soup from her local supermarket. The second shopper also goes to the
supermarket but requests a manager, explains that she needs gluten-free food,
and buys the canned soup that the manager recommends. The third shopper
visits an online retailer, searches for "gluten-free soup," and buys the first
product listed. In each case the soup turns out to contain gluten that sickens the
buyer. See DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY LAW (3d ed. forthcoming 2014), § 4.7 ("Third-Party
Beneficiaries-Limiting Rights by Disclaimer or Limitation").
163. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRrs: PHYS. & EMoT. HARM § 19 cmt. e (2010). See generally
discussion infra section II.G. But see John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, Intervening
Wrongdoing in Tort: The Restatement (Third)'s Unfortunate Embrace of Negligent Enabling, 44 WAKE
FOREST L. REv. 1211 (2009) (arguing that the Restatement (Third)'s characterization is broader than
actual practice).
164. See Danielle Keats Citron, Mainstreaming Privacy Torts, 98 CALIF. L. REV. 1805, 1838 (2010);
Volokh, supra note 34, at 14-17 (discussing when a duty to disclose information learned about others
might exist); cf Tarasoff v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 551 P.2d 334, 341 (Cal. 1976).
165. U.C.C. § 2-315 (2002); see also, e.g., Compagnia Italiana Trasporto Olii Minerali v. Sun Oil
Co., 43 F.2d 683, 685 (2d Cir. 1930); Gold Ridge Mining Co. v. Tallmadge, 74 P. 325, 327 (Or. 1903).
166. See Arlie R. Nogay, Enforcing the Rights of Remote Sellers Under the UCC: Warranty
Disclaimers, the Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose and the Notice Requirement in
the Nonprivity Context, 47 U. Prrr. L. REv. 873, 898 (1986).
167. See supra section I.B.
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child. A claim under the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose is
not available to the first family but it may be to the second, provided preparation
for a celiac is not an ordinary purpose for soup. 1 6 8 What about the third?
In this scenario, the online retailer arguably has "reason to know" both that a
celiac will consume the soup and that the shopper will rely on the retailer's
algorithms to return appropriate products. This argument may become more
persuasive as the online retailer collects more information about the customer.
Perhaps the shopper reached the retailer's website from a paid link on a
gluten-free website. Or perhaps in the past she had purchased books on celiac
disease from the retailer's website or complained in its comments section after
inadvertently buying other products with gluten.
More broadly, this implied warranty demonstrates that courts have long
viewed a seller's special knowledge as a source of liability: For companies,
there can be a downside to data collection. Since a product use or misuse that
should be known to the seller is likely to be foreseeable, this information can
also expand the content of other duties. The next section considers this foresee-
ability with respect to defects of design and information.
D. DESIGN AND INFORMATIONAL DEFECTS
A seller who can, does, or should know more about the products it sells may
be expected to foresee a wider range of product-related uses, misuses, and
harms. This section considers the meaning of reasonable design given this
potential increase in foreseeability.
At the outset, though nearly half a century of scholarship amply demonstrates
that design and informational defect actions do not fall under strict liability in
its purest sense,169 simply casting these theories onto the shore of negligence is
also misleading for at least two reasons. The most straightforward case for the
distinction's survival is the liability of sellers downstream of the manufacturer
168. Compare In re McDonald's French Fries Litig., 503 F. Supp. 2d 953, 957 (N.D. Ill. 2007)
(rejecting a similar claim because it did not consider consumption of the food at issue to be a
"particular, non-ordinary use of the product"), with Feldman v. Lederle Lab., 479 A.2d 374, 384 n.6
(N.J. 1984) (noting in dicta that a "seller may be liable for an allergic response to a product when there
is an implied warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code that the product is reasonably fit for the
purpose for which it was acquired"). For early consideration of this question, see generally Comment,
Allergy and the Implied Warranty of Fitness for a Particular Purpose, 25 FoRDHAM L. REV. 306 (1956).
The Code also states the following:
A 'particular purpose' differs from the ordinary purpose for which the goods are used in that it
envisages a specific use by the buyer which is peculiar to the nature of his business whereas
the ordinary purposes for which goods are used are those envisaged in the concept of
merchantability and go to uses which are customarily made of the goods in question. For
example, shoes are generally used for the purpose of walking upon ordinary ground, but a
seller may know that a particular pair was selected to be used for climbing mountains.
U.C.C. § 2-315 cmt. 2 (2002).
169. Strict liability in this sense is similar to enterprise liability. See, e.g., G. Edward White, The
Unexpected Persistence of Negligence, 1980-2000, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1348 (2001).
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for certain "dangerous propensit[ies]"o70 of a product even when those sellers,
having not manufactured the product, were reasonably unaware of those propen-
sities. But even for the manufacturer, the necessary analysis retains traces of
strict liability.
While the existence of a design defect would generally imply negligence on
the principle that "proper design is a matter of reasonable fitness," such an
equivalence of negligence and design defect deserves some qualification-and
social reflection. Reasonable inputs do not always result in perfect outputs: Just
as a reasonable production process may occasionally produce a dangerously
imperfect product,172 a reasonable design process may occasionally result in a
dangerously imperfect design.17 3 Indeed, "[i]t is often literally impossible or
commercially unreasonable to guarantee that software of any complexity con-
tains no errors that might cause unexpected behavior or intermittent malfunc-
tions, so-called 'bugs.' The presence of minor errors is fully within common
expectations."1 7 4 One scholar has even called software an "unavoidably unsafe
product" in the language of the Restatement (Second) of Torts' 75-at least to
the extent that it is actually a product.' 76
This tension between reasonableness of input and output raises the question
of whether a manufacturer is liable for harm caused by software flaws that are
broadly foreseeable as a class but neither reasonably preventable nor reasonably
discoverable in their individual instance. Under the pure strict liability standard
applicable only to manufacturing defects, a manufacturer would be liable even
if its "quality control efforts satisfy standards of reasonableness."' 7 7 In contrast,
under a pure negligence standard, a manufacturer would not, at least in theory,
be liable for such harm.
Under the design defects analysis of the Restatement (Third), liability de-
pends on what knowledge is imputed to the manufacturer.' 7 8 The Restatement's
170. Feldman, 479 A.2d at 387.
171. WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs 659 n.72 (4th ed. 1971); Wertheimer,
supra note 151, at 1192.
172. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1998) ("The rule for manufacturing
defects ... imposes liability whether or not the manufacturer's quality control efforts satisfy standards
of reasonableness."). However, advances in manufacturing and quality control could conceivably lead
to the conclusion that a manufacturing defect does imply an unreasonable production process.
173. Note how helpful the English language is in distinguishing among "production," "produce,"
and "product" and how utterly unhelpful it is in distinguishing among the corresponding uses of the
word "design."
174. UNIF. COMPUTER & INFO. TRANSACTIONs ACT § 403 cmt. 3(a) (2002) [hereinafter UCITA].
UCITA has not been eagerly embraced by the state governments for which it was intended. Nim
Razook, The Politics and Promise of UCITA, 36 CREIGHTON L. REv. 643, 644 (2003).
175. Seldon J. Childers, Note, Don't Stop the Music: No Strict Products Liability for Embedded
Software, 19 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 125, 167-68 (2008).
176. Id.; see infra section III.D.
177. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OFTORTs: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. a (1998).
178. See Wertheimer, supra note 151, at 1195 ("In other words, the imputation of knowledge
necessarily affects the result only where the plaintiff could not show that the manufacturer was
negligent in failing to discover the danger at issue.").
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embrace of foreseeability in this analysis 7 9 is consistent with its doctrinal
repudiation of the Wade-Keeton test,'so which assumes that a seller has "full
knowledge of its product's dangerous condition."' 8 ' However, the Restatement
does not reject all constructive knowledge; foreseeable risks, after all, include
those that a seller should have known.18 2
With respect to "mechanical products"-a potentially anachronistic term in
an increasingly electromechanical world-"a plaintiff who establishes that the
product was put to a foreseeable use need not prove that the seller should have
known of the risks that would materialize from such foreseeable use."' 8 3 This
fusion of use and risk seems to treat "durable goods"l 84 as simple deterministic
systems in which a finite range of inputs maps neatly onto a finite domain of
outputs: "Almost by definition, once the use is foreseeable, the risks that attend
such use are foreseeable."' 8 5
Assuming that a seller knows of these attendant risks removes the cost of
acquiring this knowledge from the retrospective cost-benefit analysis favored
by the Restatement.' 86 This means that a jury might be tasked with deciding
whether a realized risk of injury justified the cost of the software change posited
as the reasonable alternative design, not whether the risk of injury justified the
potentially larger cost of actually identifying the need for that change.' 87
This conceptually untenable position.-might be resolved in favor of a more
robust form of either negligence or strict liability. The amorphous concept of
foreseeability,' 8 8 which is already broad, 18 9 may contract or expand to achieve a
similar result.' 90 The state-of-the-art defense may rely more explicitly on
process-oriented functional safety standards developed by industry.191 Techno-
logical change in a broader sense may drive much of this evolution.19 2
179. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b)-(c).
180. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 cmt. m, reporters' note 1.
181. DAVID G. OWEN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY IN A NUTSHELL (8th ed., 2008) § 8.7 ("Constructive
Knowledge-The Wade-Keeton Test").




186. Id. § 2 cmt. a. Jurisdictions vary widely in the definition and application of cost-benefit
analysis. Mark A. Geistfeld, Legal Ambiguity, Liability Insurance, and Tort Reform, 60 DEPAU.L L. REv
539, 547-48 (2011).
187. E.g., N.Y. PATrERN JURY INSTR.-CIVIL: STRICT PRODS. LIAB. 2:120 (Comm. on Pattern Jury
Instructions Ass'n of Supreme Court Justices, 2013) ("It is not necessary to find that defendant CD
knew or should have known of the product's potential for causing injury in order for you to determine
that it was not reasonably safe. It is sufficient that a reasonable person who did in fact know of the
product's potential for causing injury would have concluded that the product should not have been
marketed in that condition.").
188. See Owen, supra note 156.
189. See Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Proximate Cause, the Proposed Basic Principles Restatement, and
Products Liability, 53 S.C. L. REv. 1085, 1089 (2002).
190. See Cupp, supra note 189, at 1094.
191. See, e.g., ISO 26262.
192. See Owen, supra note 156.
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Increasing proximity, for its part, will likely reduce the legal and practical
significance of the seller's initial knowledge, whether actual or constructed.
As that seller learns more about post-sale use of its product, more risks will
be foreseeable and foreseen, even when no harm results. An automaker that
receives real-time notification of system errors or unusual braking patterns, for
example, may be able to ascertain latent issues or novel misuses. These new
risks would be relevant to a claim of design or informational defect in any unit
of the product that is subsequently marketed: The seller may not have known
prior to the first sale, the argument would go, but it should have learned quickly
thereafter.193 Similarly, rapid advances in technology could render some prod-
ucts obsolete on their way from the factory to the warehouse.
Rapidly increasing foreseeability and capability could mean that a bystander
injured by a product sold one year has a classic design or informational defect
claim that a similarly situated bystander later injured by an identical product
sold the previous year does not-a disparity that actually does comport with a
foreseeability-based approach to products liability. And yet a proximity-driven
expansion in post-sale duties, discussed in the next two sections, could offer an
alternate route to recovery for both victims.
E. POST-SALE DUTY TO WARN
Proximity could deteriorate remaining rationales for limiting a post-sale duty
to warn. This post-sale duty is distinct from the point-of-sale duty to warn that
underlies the common' 9 4 claim of informational defect.19 5 Both duties, how-
ever, are premised in part on an informational disparity between the commercial
seller and the downstream party.19 6
Unlike its predecessor (and, arguably, persistent competitor), the Restatement
193. For a discussion of corporate knowledge, see infra section II.G concerning enabling torts.
194. See Hildy Bowbeer et al., Warning! Failure to Read This Article May Be Hazardous to Your
Failure to Warn Defense, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 439, 439-40 (2000). See generally M. Stuart
Madden, The Duty to Warn in Products Liability: Contours and Criticism, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 221 (1987)
(detailing the doctrinal and policy underpinnings of the leading interpretations of a seller's duty to
warn); James Forrest McKell Jr., Comment, Chatter Clatter and Blinks: Defective Car Alerts and the
Role of Techological Advances in Design Defect/Failure to Warn Cases, DuKE L. & TECH. REV. (2010)
(analyzing when a deficient alert becomes a defective product tort claim and determining how to
differentiate between a design defect and failure to warn claim); Michael A. Pittenger, Note, Reformulat-
ing the Strict Liability Failure to Warn, 49 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1509, 1514-24 (1992) (documenting
the development of strict liability failure to warn). These claims are as academically contentious as
they are common. E.g., Bernard W. Bell, The Manufacturer's Duty to Notify of Subsequent Safety
Improvements, 33 STAN. L. REV. 1087 (1981); Alani Golanski, Paradigm Shifts in Products Liability
and Negligence, 71 U. Prrr. L. REv. 673 (2010); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski,
Doctrinal Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REv. 265
(1990); Madden, supra; Victor Schwartz, The Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Two Unfortunate Forks in the
Road to a Reasonable Doctrine, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 892 (1983); J. Scott Dutcher, Comment, Caution:
This Superman Suit Will Not Enable You to Fly-Are Consumer Product Warning Labels Out of
Control?, 38 ARiz. ST. L.J. 633 (2006).
195. See supra section II.D (design and informational defects).




(Third) of Products Liability contemplates liability for a seller or distributor's
failure to provide an appropriate warning after the sale of a product.1 97 Sec-
tion 10 provides in part that
[o]ne engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products
is subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the seller's
failure to provide a warning after the time of sale or distribution of a prod-
uct if a reasonable person in the seller's position would provide such a
warning.' 9 8
Although a uniform and consistent post-sale duty did not and does not exist
among the states,' 9 9 the Restatement (Third)'s provision has "received a mixed
but generally favorable reception in the law since 1998,",200 and "more than
thirty states have [since] adopted various versions of duties arising after the sale
of a product." 2 0 1 Plaintiffs presumably welcome this duty: In addition to pre-
senting an additional basis for recovery, a post-sale duty to warn might also
offer certain "strategic advantages" 202 like "avoid[ing] a statute of repose" or
"a defense based on a user's substantial modification of a product," "negat[ing]
a state-of-the-art defense," and "allow[ing] before a jury otherwise inadmissible
evidence."2 03
In order to limit what its reporters described as "the most expansive area in
the law of products liability,"204 the Restatement (Third) explains that:
A reasonable person in the seller's position would provide a warning after the
time of sale if:
(1) the seller knows or reasonably should know that the product poses a
substantial risk of harm to persons or property; and
(2) those to whom a warning might be provided can be identified and can
reasonably be assumed to be unaware of the risk of harm; and
197. See RESTATEMENT (THuRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 (1998); Kevin Reynolds & Richard J.
Kirschman, The Ten Myths of Product Liability, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 551, 568-69 (2000); Kenneth
Ross, Post-Sale Duty to Warn: A Critical Cause of Action, 27 WM. MITCHELL L. REv. 339, 341-42
(2000); Kenneth Ross & J. David Prince, Post-Sale Duties: The Most Expansive Theory in Products
Liability, 74 BROOK. L. REV. 963, 964-65 (2009); Tom Stilwell, Warning: You May Possess Continuing
Duties After the Sale of Your Product! (An Evaluation of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability's Treatment of Post-Sale Duties), 26 REv. LmG. 1035, 1037-38 (2007); see also Golanski,
supra note 194, at 704.
198. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10(a) (1998).
199. See Ross & Prince, supra note 197, at 963-64.
200. Id. at 984.
201. Stilwell, supra note 197, at 1037.
202. Douglas R. Richmond, Expanding Products Liability: Manufacturers' Post-Sale Duties to
Warn, Retrofit and Recall, 36 IDAHO L. REv. 7, 10 (1999).
203. Id. But see generally Frank E. Kulbaski III, Statutes of Repose and the Post-Sale Duty to Warn:
Time for a New Interpretation, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1027 (2000) (discussing statutes of repose).
204. Ross & Prince, supra note 197, at 965 (quoting JAMES A. HENDERSON JR. & AARON TWERSKI,
TEACHER'S MANUAL FOR PRODUCTS LIABILITY-. PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 159 (6th ed. 2008)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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(3) a warning can be effectively communicated to and acted on by those to
whom a warning might be provided; and
(4) the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the burden of providing a
warning.2 05
Proximity represents a dramatic and often deliberate expansion of a seller's
knowledge of when, where, how, why, by whom, and for what its products are
used. This expansion tends to undermine each of the limitations identified by
the Restatement.2 06
The Restatement's observation that "constantly monitoring product perfor-
mance in the field is usually too burdensome" 2 0 7 might be empirically refuted
by the increasing incidence of such monitoring, at least for particular product
types. Furthermore, greater opportunities for customer communication, in-
cluding social media, will increase the likelihood that risks are independently
"brought to the attention of sellers." 208 Unlike the ongoing research and testing
often discussed in the context of pharmaceuticals,2 09 this accidental knowledge
may take effort to avoid acquiring.2 10
This same proximity increases the likelihood that "those to whom a warning
might be provided can be identified." As one scholar notes, "This obstacle may
easily be overcome where . .. the manufacturer has a continuing relationship
with product users." 2 11 Leases, service contracts, loyalty programs, customer
marketing, and even end-user license agreements are forms of an ongoing
relationship, even with users other than the original buyers.
Many of these relationships, in tum, may enable efficient communication
with users.212 Here too the Restatement remains understandably grounded in a
past where "original customer sales records indicat[ing] which individuals are
probably using and consuming the product in question" might enable "direct
communication of a warning."2 " Marketable consumer data from Google
searches, Facebook likes, and Instagram photos214 may well facilitate far more
effective communication, even in cases where users are nominally anonymous.
And some products may simply notify the user directly.
This increasingly efficient communication can reduce "the burden of provid-
205. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: PRODs. LIAB. § 10(b) (1998).
206. Some courts have considered additional factors as well. See Richmond, supra note 202, at
42-46 (discussing eight: nature of the market, nature of the harm, frequency of the harm, intended life
of the product, number of units sold, time between sale and injury, continuing relationship with the
user, and continued involvement in the industry).
207. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TO1rS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 cmt. c (1998).
208. Id.
209. See supra note 31.
210. Cf discussion infra II.G.
211. Richmond, supra note 202, at 30.
212. The Restatement (Third)'s formulation is broader than "users," but users are more likely to be
reachable.
213. RESTATEMENT (TmIRD) OF TORrs: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 cmt. g (1998).
214. I expect any future readers to laugh at these references as terribly quaint.
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ing a warning" 215-at least to the extent that broader impacts on consumer
privacy are not cognizable as relevant burdens.2 16 The Restatement again
asserts that "post-sale warnings are invariably costly to provide," 217 but while
reaching every last person exposed to risk from a particular product might
remain costly, warning the majority may not be. This is reasonable care as an
individualized imperative.
This "last-mile problem" could nonetheless produce different approaches
among jurisdictions. 2 18 "Whether a post-sale duty to warn exists is a question
of law for the trial court, not a question of fact for the jury. Once a court
determines that a post-sale duty to warn exists, however, the general rule is that
the breach of that duty is a fact question for the jury."219 Under a broad
construction of duty, the jury may determine whether the seller's outreach was
reasonable with respect to the particular plaintiff-outreach that could be
directed at that plaintiff or at the product user whose actions contributed to her
injury. Under a narrower construction, however, the judge may decide whether
such a duty, in a specific relational sense, exists with respect to the particular
plaintiff. Regardless, greater proximity could expand conceptions of relational
duty2 2 0 as well as reasonability.
Return briefly to the point-of-sale duty differentiated from the post-sale duty
at the beginning of this section: "The primary difference between the two types
of claims is that when the manufacturer discovers the danger after the product's
sale, the manufacturer no longer controls the product." 2 2 1 To the extent that
proximity implies control over product or user, this difference is increasingly
illusory. This notion of control could also drive recognition and expansion of
another post-sale duty with even greater consequences-a duty which this
Article considers next.
F. POST-SALE DUTY TO UPDATE
I turn now to a "rare" 222 duty that noted scholars have vigorously rejected 2 23
and that courts have "repeatedly refused to recognize,"224 with the exceptions
215. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRrs: PRODS. LIAB. § 10(b)(4) (1998).
216. See generally Volokh, supra note 34.
217. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 cmt. d.
218. Stilwell, supra note 197, at 1055-56.
219. Richmond, supra note 202, at 48.
220. See supra section II.B.
221. Michael L. Matula, Manufacturers' Post-Sale Duties in the 1990s, 32 TORT & INS. L.J. 87, 92
(1996); see also Richmond, supra note 202, at 18-19.
222. Kevin R. Boyle, The Expanding Post-Sale Duty of a Manufacturer: Does a Manufacturer Have
a Duty to Retrofit its Products?, 38 ARIZ. L. REV. 1033, 1041 (1996).
223. See, e.g., Richmond, supra note 202; Richard A. Epstein, Commentary, Symposium: The
Passage of Time: The Implications for Product Liability, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 930 (1983).
224. Richmond, supra note 202, at 56-57. Although courts frequently reject this duty, they do not
necessarily foreclose it entirely. Id. at 56; see, e.g., Gregory v. Cincinnati Inc., 538 N.W.2d 325, 340
(Mich. 1995) ("In either case, absent some assumption of a duty or some controlling relationship, we
elect not to impose such an onerous duty on manufacturers.").
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purportedly amounting in some cases to "intellectually vacant aberrations." 2 2 5 It
is the post-sale duty to update, which I mean to encompass both recall and
retrofit. As one skeptical court cautioned, "Imposing upon manufacturers an
extra-statutory duty to recall and retrofit used products to incorporate post-sale
state of the art designs would be the equivalent of mandating that manufacturers
insure that their products will always comply with current safety standards."22 6
But here, too, proximity is poised to produce a different outcome for two
reasons: The initial sale may be eclipsed by subsequent sales, or it may be sub-
sumed under continuing relationships.
The first reason-that subscription-based services, over-the-air updates, and
relational contracting arguably effect recurring product sales-belies the very
term "post-sale." Consider, for example, software to run a home security system
that is automatically updated a year after the system is first purchased. The year
of initial purchase may remain relevant for some claims of defect, particularly
those concerning hardware. However, for changes made during the update-and
possibly related changes that were not made but could have been-the later year
may be dispositive. This also means that what the seller did or could know and
do would be measured at the time of the last transaction rather than the first. In
other words, some allegations that new software-based hazards were either
introduced or uncorrected years after the initial sale may be more properly
cognizable as classic design defect claims.22 7
Alternatively, to the extent that an over-the-air update operates as a "virtual
recall],"22 8 then the seller may have a duty to reasonably conduct that up-
date. 2 2 9 The Restatement (Third) recognizes this duty on the principle that a
manufacturer should not be subject to a lesser obligation if it avoids an
inevitable regulatory recall by voluntarily acting.230 Although this rationale
suggests that not every update is a recall, it is consistent with an obligation of
reasonableness in a broader class of cases.
The same considerations of information, access, and control underlying a
post-sale duty to warn provide a second route to a post-sale duty to update. 2 3 1 It
is notable that "the three seminal cases" recognizing this duty come from
aviation.2 32 One scholar attributes this to the significant "potential for human
225. Richmond, supra note 202, at 60.
226. Modelski v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 707 N.E.2d 239, 247 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
227. Cf H.R. REP. No. 103-525 pt. 2, at 6 (1994) (noting that aircrafts are frequently updated).
228. E.g., Bryant Walker Smith, Autolaw 3.0, Transportation Research Board 2012 Workshop on
Road Vehicle Automation (July 2012), http://onlinepubs.trb.org/onlinepubs/conferences/2012/Automation/
presentations/WalkerSmith.pdf.
229. Stilwell, supra note 197, at 1045.
230. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF Toirs: PRODS. LIAB. § II cmt. a (1998).
231. These two duties are expressly linked by a rarely recognized duty to warn of improvements.
232. Boyle, supra note 222, at 1036 (discussing Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtis-Wright Corp.,
411 F.2d 451 (2d Cir. 1969), Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232 (3d Cir. 1964), and Bell
Helicopter v. Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979)). See generally id. at 1035-36.
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injury in aviation."23 3 An equally important consideration, however, appears to
be the close and continuing relationship between an aircraft maker and its
customers: As part of their "normal practice," these manufacturers continue to
provide advice on the maintenance, operation, and overhaul of their aircraft.23 4
One scholar, while arguing against the imposition of a duty to update,
nonetheless discerns three absolute requisites from relevant case law. 235 The
first, that "the danger the product poses must be so extraordinary, pronounced,
or special that a post-sale warning will not protect consumers,"2 36 describes the
perception or reality of many increasingly sophisticated physical products.23 7
The others, that "the manufacturer must be able to identify and locate product
owners or users" 238 and "regain control of the product," 239 relate directly to
proximity. In cases recognizing this duty, "the manufacturer has typically
regained control of the product after learning of a way to improve its safety, or
has retained the ability to force an owner or operator to make the necessary
improvements." 24 0 This ability may arise "where the manufacturer maintains a
special or controlling post-sale relationship with the owner of the product." 2 4 1
This continued control over the product or the user is a hallmark of proxim-
ity.2 4 2 Increasing connectivity may give manufacturers the technical ability to
remotely update or disable certain product functions. At the same time, a new
contractual privity comprising leases, end-user license agreements, and terms of
use may give them legal means to retain or assert control over how their
products are used and disposed.
Some courts may continue to broadly reject a duty to update on policy
grounds. Proximity does not change the argument that legislatures or adminis-
trative agencies are better suited to recognize new obligations, and ongoing
233. Boyle, supra note 222, at 1036.
234. Noel v. United Aircraft Corp., 342 F.2d 232, 241 (1964). Although post-sale warnings are a
form of continuing advice, the existence of a post-sale duty to warn does not imply a post-sale duty to
update. E.g., Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1315 (Kan. 1993) (considering a
post-sale duty to warn but categorically rejecting a post-sale duty to update).
235. Richmond, supra note 202, at 60.
236. Id.
237. Motor vehicles certainly pose special dangers, and the fully automated variety may not even
have users in the classic sense who can be warned. And homes-probably even smart homes-can be
hazardous places burdened with high expectations.
238. Richmond, supra note 202, at 60. Richmond emphasizes without further explanation that
merely "alleg[ing] that a manufacturer ought to be able to identify owners or users of a particular
product" should be insufficient. Id.
239. Id.
240. Id. at 49.
241. Boyle, supra note 222, at 1041 (citing Gregory v. Cincinnati Inc., 538 N.W.2d 325, 335-36
(Mich. 1995)); see also Jeffrey A. Lamken, Note, Efficient Accident Prevention as a Continuing Obli-
gation: The Duty to Recall Defective Products, 42 STAN. L. REv. 103, 110 (1989).
242. The continuation of manufacturer control may address Professor Epstein's argument that "a
recurrent weakness of modern product liability law is that it always takes the obligation to maintain
product safety away from the party in possession of the product and imposes it on someone further up
the chain of distribution, who often has less control over product safety." Epstein, supra note 223, at
933.
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obligations may still create perverse incentives. Because some updates may re-
quire costly research, development, and testing, the duty to update might dis-
courage manufacturers from marketing remotely updatable products243-though
ultimately a lack of remote updatability may itself constitute a design defect
arising at the point of sale. 2 44 Post-sale duties may also discourage manufac-
turers from making their products last longer.24 5 But in the curious case of
technological innovation in physical products, durability may actually be unde-
sirable: To the extent that today's cars, refrigerators, and other machines are
safer than those of the past (and excluding broader costs of rapid consumption),
quickly disposing of or upgrading old products may produce safety gains.
Companies that can control their products post-sale may also be able to
control the uses of those products. That capability is central to the final sub-
stantive basis that this Part considers.
G. NEGLIGENT ENABLING
Proximity drives the set of so-called "enabling torts" 246 that lie at the edge of
current tort law. 2 4 7 This set of established and emerging theories is directed at
"a remote actor whose wrong consists of setting the stage for a second wrong-
doer who inflicts injury on a victim,"24 8 often by providing dangerous instrumen-
talities 249 like cars, guns, cigarettes, unguarded buildings, or even information.2 5 0
These theories assert a substantive duty to reasonably mitigate conditions that
render dangerous a particular instrumentality, user, or use.25 '
Curiously, two scholars who reject enabling torts as a singular concept 252
nonetheless identify a strong basis for expanding the content of such a duty.
With respect to the most established of these torts, negligent entrustment,2 53 the
243. Cf Randal C. Picker, Rewinding Sony: The Evolving Product, Phoning Home and the Duty of
Ongoing Design, 55 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 749 (2005). This burden analysis may be relevant both to a
court determining whether to recognize a duty to update and to a jury deciding whether such a duty has
been breached.
244. Cf id. at 761 ("We need to regard the choice about how and whether a product evolves as
being one of the central decisions that arises in product design."), 767-68 (proposing a test for
copyright infringement that distinguishes between updatable and nonupdatable products); cf also infra
section II.G (willful blindness).
245. Cf Kulbaski, supra note 203, at 1033 (discussing statutes of repose).
246. Rabin, supra note 160, at 436 (internal quotation marks omitted). But see generally Goldberg &
Zipursky, supra note 163 (rejecting a singular category or theory of enabling torts).
247. See Rabin, supra note 160, at 452; see also Richard C. Ausness, Tort Liability for the Sale of
Non-Defective Products: An Analysis and Critique of the Concept of Negligent Marketing, 53 S.C.
L. REv. 907, 939 (2002).
248. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 163, at 1211.
249. See Rabin, supra note 160, at 450; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 163, at 1219.
250. See Citron, supra note 164, at 1838 (discussing cases where disclosure of others' personal
information violated the duty of reasonable care).
251. See Rabin, supra note 160, at 445; RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRrs: PHYs. & EMoT. HARM § 19
(2010).
252. Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 163, at 1244.
253. Negligent entrustment is based on the principle that a person who "exercises control over,"
id. at 1219 n.34, a "dangerous instrumentality-almost always a car or gun-is obligated to others
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"lynchpin of liability is the possessor's continuing dominion over the property:
his power to permit or prohibit use of the dangerous item."25 4 Channeling
Voltaire, these scholars explain that "the right of control" implies "an attendant
responsibility to be prudent in granting others access to the item."25 5 In contrast
to bailments,25 6 outright sales or donations are less likely to qualify as entrust-
ments2 5 7 precisely because such transactions are explicit repudiations of continu-
ing control.
Except, however, when they aren't. The very purpose of an end-user license
agreement is to extend the seller's control beyond the point of sale by contractu-
ally specifying the terms under which the product may be used or disposed, and
the function of a subscription plan is to condition continued use on continued
payment. In these cases, a company's ongoing control over a product could
imply a commensurate responsibility to restrict, by contractual or technological
means, access by those clearly incompetent to handle it.
Information, access, and control are all relative concepts with inchoate
forms. 2 5 8 One court, while conditioning a psychiatrist's duty to the public on a
legal and factual ability to control the patient,259 nonetheless noted that "in
certain circumstances a doctor [may be] under a duty to establish control." 2 6 0
Similarly, information might be acquirable but not actually acquired, or it might
be processable but not actually processed. The Department of Defense even
believes that not all acquisition is collection.2 6 1 As the remainder of this section
discusses, knowledge may range from actual and individualized to constructive
and collective.
Actual knowledge is likely to be one of the central issues in the expansion of
who might foreseeably be harmed by the property's misuse not to permit its use by someone whom
the possessor knows (or in some jurisdictions, has reason to know) is incompetent to handle it," id.
at 1219-20.
254. Id. at 1220. Professor Rabin criticizes the notion of "control" as applied to unknown tortfea-
sors, Rabin, supra note 160, at 440. A broader conception that also includes control over real and
personal property, however, encompasses more of the cases he identifies.
255. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 163, at 1220.
256. See Arthur Cholodofsky, Note, Torts: Does the Negligent Entrustment Doctrine Apply to
Sellers?, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 925, 946-50 (1988) (distinguishing between sales and bailments).
257. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 163, at 1220. But see Cholodofsky, supra note 256, at
929-35 (discussing "negligent sale" doctrine in California); West v. E. Tenn. Pioneer Oil Co., 172
S.W.3d 545, 555 (Tenn. 2005) (distinguishing vicarious liability and negligent entrustment) ("Control
therefore need only exist at the time of the entrustment for a prima facie case of negligent entrust-
ment.").
258. Cf Smith, Automated Vehicles, supra note 12, at 435-37, 485-87 (discussing control).
259. See Hasenei v. United States, 541 F. Supp. 999, 1011-12 (D. Md. 1982); see also Robert F.
Schopp, The Psychotherapist's Duty to Protect the Public: The Appropriate Standard and the Founda-
tion in Legal Theory and Empirical Premises, 70 NEB. L. REv. 327, 335 (1991). Foreseeability links
control and information. See Hasenei, 542 F. Supp. at 1012.
260. Hasenei, 541 F. Supp. at 1012 n.23.
261. See DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE, DoD 5240.1-R, PROCEDURES GOVERNING THE AcrivrnEs OF DoD
INTELLIGENCE COMPONENTS THAT AFFEcT UNITED STATES PERSONS 15 (Dec. 1982) ("Data acquired by
electronic means is 'collected"' only when it has been processed into intelligible form."), available at
http://www.fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/d5240_I r.pdf.
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enabling torts. Some jurisdictions require knowledge of incompetence in negli-
gent entrustment cases, while others do not.2 62 The question of "whether 'prior
incidents' are a prerequisite to establishing a duty of precautionary conduct" is
one "that has plagued courts around the country" in landlord cases.2 63 And
while the Restatement (Third) of Torts suggests a distinction between the duties
of relatives and retailers,2 64 actual knowledge may be the more appropriate
distinction. Indeed, a relative "would almost certainly have knowledge of ...
[a car] buyer's unsuitability,"265 and there is "a strong case for" the liability of a
commercial gun seller who "actually knows of the evidently dangerous character-
istics of the buyer."2 6 6
A seller's role as an "information hub" about not only its products, 267 but also
the uses and users of those products, is therefore relevant. The more personal
information a company or a network of companies collects, analyzes, and
shares, the more it starts to resemble the defendant who finances her nephew's
car purchase despite knowing him to be an alcoholic who cannot lawfully
drive2 68 or the service station whose employees pump gas for a visibly intoxi-
cated driver.2 69 In both these examples, the facilitating party was held to have a
duty of reasonable care to the third-party victim who was subsequently injured
in a vehicle crash.270
Actual knowledge is a difficult concept when applied to corporate entities.
Consider a credit card company 271 that approves a fuel purchase at a gas station
with which it is affiliated 2 7 2 even though the cardholder has charged $60 ten
minutes prior at a tavern, makes regular payments on the same card to an
alcohol abuse center, entered the wrong ZIP code three times, and just posted a
series of incoherent driving-related messages from a Twitter account that the
company is "following." A natural person presented with these facts might
conclude the cardholder to be driving drunk; a company that analyzed them
might reach the same conclusion with at least as much confidence. But the
262. See Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 163, at 1220 n.37.
263. Rabin, supra note 160, at 445.
264. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PHYS. & EMoT. HARM § 19, reporters' note cmt. h (2010); see
also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TOirs § 390 cmt. b (1965).
265. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRrs: PHYS. & EMoT. HARM § 19, reporters' note cmt. h (2010).
266. Id. (citing Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp., 697 So.2d 1200 (Fla. 1997)).
267. This is the context in which the phrase "information hub" was presciently used in Epstein,
supra note 223, at 931.
268. Cf Vince v. Wilson, 561 A.2d 103, 104, 106 (Vt. 1989) (finding the defendant liable to the
plaintiff for the injuries caused by the grandnephew); see also Rabin, supra note 160, at 438-39.
269. See West v. E. Tenn. Pioneer Oil Co., 172 S.W.3d 545 (Tenn. 2005); see also Carmel Sileo, Gas
Company May Be Liable for Station's Sale of Fuel to Drunk Driver, TRIAL, Nov. 1, 2004, at 100
(describing the appellate court's holding).
270. See Vince, 561 A.2d at 106; West, 172 S.W.3d at 552.
271. For an argument that credit cards are products, see Adam Goldstein, Why "It Pays" to "Leave
Home Without It": Examining the Legal Culpability of Credit Card Issuers Under Tort Principles of
Products Liability, 2006 U. ILL. L. REv. 827 (2006).
272. Cf EXXONMOBIL CREDIT CARDS, http://creditcards.citicards.com/usc/rpg/exxonmobillmicrosite/
(last visited Sept. 10, 2013).
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relationship among acquisition, analysis, and knowledge is not entirely clear.
In criminal law, the doctrine of "collective knowledge" provides that, "in
certain circumstances, [a] corporation can be convicted on the basis of its
employees' collective knowledge and intent," "even if no single employee has
the intent necessary to commit a crime."2 73 In a prosecution of a bank under the
Currency Transaction Reporting Act, for example, the jury was instructed
to look at the bank as an institution. As such, its knowledge is the sum of the
knowledge of all of the employees ... within the scope of their employment.
So, if Employee A knows one facet of the currency reporting requirement,
B knows another facet of it, and C a third facet of it, the bank knows them
all.274
The Supreme Court has imported a related doctrine,27 5 willful blindness,
from criminal law into patent law. 2 7 6 After concluding that the pertinent statu-
tory provision requires actual knowledge of patent infringement,27 7 the Court
held that willful blindness meets this standard while reckless indifference does
not.2 7 8 "Given the long history of willful blindness and its wide acceptance in
the Federal Judiciary," the majority saw "no reason why the doctrine should
not apply in civil lawsuits for induced patent infringement under 35 U.S.C.
§ 271(b)."2 7 9 Although collective knowledge is not nearly as established as
willful blindness,2 80 this explanation at least suggests its potential application to
tort law.
Standing alone, willful blindness also has implications for proximity-driven
liability. A seller that avoids acquiring or analyzing certain data might be acting
in a way that is both reasonable and desirable.28 1 If, however, this policy
represents a "deliberate action[] to avoid confirming a [subjectively] high
probability of wrongdoing,"2 82 then the company might be said to have the
273. Patricia S. Abril & Ann Morales Olazdbal, The Locus of Corporate Scienter, 2006 COLUM. Bus.
L. REv. 81, 115. This is also called "collective knowledge, composite knowledge, collective intent,
piecemeal attribution, attribution of knowledge, and aggregate corporate knowledge, among other
terms." Id. (citations omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
274. Abril & Olazdbal, supra note 273, at 118 (quoting United States v. Bank of New England,
N.A., 821 F.2d 844, 855-56 (1st Cir. 1987) (quoting trial court's jury instructions)). But see Thomas A.
Hagemann & Joseph Grinstein, The Mythology of Aggregate Corporate Knowledge: A Deconstruction,
65 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 210, 210 (1997) (characterizing that court's holding in terms of willful blindness
rather than collective knowledge).
275. See Abril & Olazhbal, supra note 273, at 121; William S. Duffey, Jr. & Phyllis B. Sumner,
Collective Knowledge and Willful Blindness-New Liability Under Old Law, 5 S.C. LAw. 32, 33 (1994);
Hagemann & Grinstein, supra note 274.
276. See Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060 (2011).
277. See id. at 2068.
278. See id.
279. Id. at 2069. But see Jacob S. Sherkow, Patent Infringement as Criminal Conduct, 19 MICH.
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 1 (2012) (suggesting reasons).
280. See Hagemann & Grinstein, supra note 274.
281. See Volokh, supra note 34.
282. Global-Tech Appliances, Inc. v. SEB S.A., 131 S. Ct. 2060, 2070-71 (2011).
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actual knowledge upon which enabling torts are sometimes premised. An
in-vehicle telematics system that gives the user the option to temporarily disable
the reporting of speed, for example, may cross this line.
As this section has explored, a seller that knows its product is being abused
and has the ability to prevent that abuse might face a claim for negligent
enablement. But this situation could also evidence a foreseeable product risk
that the seller failed to address in its initial design, failed to warn against at or
after the sale, or even failed to correct in a subsequent update. Proximity could
drive all these claims.
H. RECLAIMING PROXIMITY
As this part has discussed, the obligations of a defendant depend in part on its
information about, access to, and control over the product, property, person, or
activity at issue. This duty-driving conception of proximity contrasts with the
duty-limiting function of proximate cause. 2 83 Indeed, requirements of privity28 4
or control285 have also been used by courts to limit tort liability.
In a sense, this Article reclaims proximity as an affirmative source of lia-
bility.2 86 Information about a customer's specific needs can create an obligation
to meet those needs,2 87 and information about a product's actual performance
can create an obligation to address newly foreseeable risks.288 Information
about a product in combination with access to its users can create an ongoing
obligation to warn those users of dangers associated with that product.2 89
Finally, control over a product, its users, or its uses could conceivably create an
ongoing obligation to update that product 290 or restrict those uses.291
These pressures arise from the application of current legal precedent to
emerging business practice. However, as the next section argues, they may
counterintuitively help drive that practice toward greater proximity.
283. See Cupp, supra note 189.
284. See supra section II.B. (relational duty).
285. See, e.g., David Potts, Engler v. Gulf Interstate Engineering, Inc. and the Role of Control in
Vicarious Liability, 54 ARIZ. L. REV. 1157, 1166 (2012); Schopp, supra note 259, at 335-36; Peter
Tipps, Controlling the Lead Paint Debate: Why Control Is Not an Element of Public Nuisance,
50 B.C. L. REv. 605, 628 (2009). If absolute control (or the lack thereof) explains the doctrines of
contributory negligence and superseding cause, then relative control explains the shift to comparative
negligence; Courtney Shaw, Note, Uncertain Justice: Liability of Multinationals Under the Alien Tort
Claims Act, 54 STAN. L. REV. 1359, 1375 (2002). Cf Michael D. Green, The Unanticipated Ripples of
Comparative Negligence: Superseding Cause in Products Liability and Beyond, 53 S.C. L. REv. 1103,
1123 (2002).
286. This Article's definition of proximity-information about, access, to and control over the
product, property, person, or activity at issue-may also be useful as an explicit test for courts facing
novel claims and novel technologies.
287. See supra section II.C. (noting that the seller must also have reason to know of the customer's
reliance).
288. See supra section I.D.
289. See supra section II.E.
290. See supra section II.E
291. See supra section IIG.
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III. LIABILITY AS A DRIVER OF PROXIMITY
The previous Part argued that proximity could drive liability by expanding
the obligations of sellers. There is, however, a more complex picture of the
relationship between liability and proximity, one in which proximity is a
response to as well as a source of liability. New technologies, including those
that facilitate proximity, are increasing technical, legal, and reputational uncer-
tainty. Companies may choose to manage this broader uncertainty through a
variety of technical and contractual tools that fall roughly into three broad
categories: private repose, dynamic risk management, and service models.
A. THE EFFECT OF UNCERTAINTY
All else being the same, greater duty might imply greater liability. All else,
however, will not be the same: In the future, products may be safer, practical
obstacles to litigation may be greater, or business models may be different.
More broadly, the world is evolving, and extrapolating only those variables of
immediate interest while holding all others constant seems a poor approach for
actually forecasting broader social, legal, and technological change.2 92
This change will contribute to uncertainty about the product-related risks
borne directly and indirectly by individuals and companies. These risks relate in
part to the technical performance of novel products,29 3 to the application of
evolving legal rules and standards to those products,2 94 and to the reputational
effects on companies and even industries when those products actually or
allegedly fail. 2 9 5 As risks become less certain-that is, less susceptible to
reliable estimation-they become harder to price and insure.29 6
For this reason, companies often seek certainty.m A company that under-
292. See, e.g., The Jetsons, WARNER BROs., http://www2.warnerbros.com/wamervideo/classiccartoons/
jetsons.html (last visited Sept. 13, 2013). This approach does, however, work fairly well for science
fiction, which must balance the futuristic and the familiar.
293. Advanced, particularly autonomous, technologies may be deployed without a perfect understand-
ing of their real-world behavior. Designers of highly complex products cannot identify, much less test,
every scenario that their products will encounter, even if those scenarios are in a broad sense entirely
foreseeable. Cf Owen, supra note 156 (describing the paradox of foreseeability). The glare of sun on
the snow, for example, might confuse an automated vehicle's vision in ways that are generally but not
specifically predictable. After all, every snowflake is different-at least in one sense. Daniel Engber,
Are Snowflakes Really Different?, StArE (July 20, 2006), http://www.slate.com/articles/news-and politics/
explainer/2006/07/aresnowflakes really-different.html.
294. See supra Part II.
295. Consumers, shareholders, and the public at large can act capriciously, particularly when
confronting the unknown. An immediate or continuing loss of sales can be disastrous for a manufac-
turer. Even blanket tort immunity cannot assuage, and might exacerbate, the anger or distrust of the
company or industry associated with an alleged product failure. Indeed, reputation may influence a
company's behavior more than liability. See Polinsky & Shavell, supra note 161, at 1449-50.
296. See Mark A. Geistfeld, supra note 186, at 540-41 (discussing "Frank Knight's renowned
distinction between 'risk' and 'uncertainty"').
297. See, e.g., id. at 541 ("The insurance industry embraces risk and abhors uncertainty."); Bryant
Walker Smith, Stakeholder Reaction to Emissions Trading in the United States, the European Union,
and the Netherlands, 25 J. LAND USE & ENvm. L., 137, 138 (2009) ("The broad conclusion, to which
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stands its risks can generally pass the costs of mitigation or insurance to its
customers. In contrast, a company that cannot or does not accurately estimate
these risks may make inefficient decisions about product deployment or pricing.
To the extent that these decisions lead to the marketing of unsafe products or
impede consumer adoption of safer products, the costs may in some cases be
measured in lives lost.
Nonetheless, there are at least three reasons why providing legal certainty
may not always be socially desirable. First, the flexibility present in a fair
system of justice necessarily involves some uncertainty.2 9 8 Second, uncertainty
may help deter activities that have negative externalities. 299 Third, increasing
certainty for one actor may mean shifting costs to another.30 0
Two prominent federal products liability reforms illustrate the cost-shifting
that can occur when Congress reactively shields industries from litigation over
their products or practices. The Protection of Lawful Commerce in Arms Act of
2005301 and the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994302 unilaterally
curtail legal remedies in both state and federal courts. 30 3 The 2005 measure
prohibits certain civil actions against gun makers,30 4 and the 1994 measure
specifies an 18-year statute of repose3 05 for certain claims against manufacturers
of small aircraft.306 These measures limit liability without addressing the perfor-
mance of the products at issue, other risks faced by these companies, or the
the remainder of the article provides context, is straightforward: Industry dislikes regulation. It strongly
dislikes [regulatory] redundancy. It loathes uncertainty.").
298. See Geistfeld, supra note 186, at 570 ("Uncertainty per se is not an evil that must be avoided at
all costs by the tort system. Liability rules that do not accommodate the factual uncertainty inherent in a
world of limited information, for example, are unlikely to be fair or just. At least some uncertainty is
also inherent in the exercise of legal judgment, including the jury's determination of reasonable care for
important classes of cases.").
299. However, if the status quo has greater externalities, such deterrence may not be desirable.
300. See Jeffrey O'Connell, Balanced Proposals for Product Liability Reform, 48 OHIo ST. L.J. 317,
319 (1987) ("The least appealing way to reform the tort system is to make it even harder for injured
parties to be paid.").
301. 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7903 (2012).
302. 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012). See generally, e.g., Victor E. Schwartz & Leah Lorber, The General
Aviation Revitalization Act: How Rational Civil Justice Reform Revitalized an Industry, 67 J. AIR L. &
Com. 1269 (2002); Robert F. Hedrick, A Close and Critical Analysis of the New General Aviation
Revitalization Act, 62 J. AIR L. & Com. 385 (1996); Nathan J. Rice, Comment, The General Aviation
Revitalization Act of 1994: A Ten-Year Retrospective, 2004 Wis. L. REv. 945 (2004).
303. This is admittedly arguable with respect to the 2005 measure, which targeted claims that at that
point had seen at most mixed success in the courts. See Allen Rostron, Lawyers, Guns, & Money: The
Rise and Fall of Tort Litigation Against the Firearms Industry, 46 SANTA CLARA L. REv. 481, 510-11
(2006) (book review).
304. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 7901-7902 (2012). The measure does not prohibit negligent entrustment
claims against sellers. See id.
305. For relevant discussion of statutes of repose, see generally Frank E. Kulbaski III, Statutes of
Repose and the Post-Sale Duty to Warn: Time for a New Interpretation, 32 CoNN. L. REv. 1027 (2000)
and Geistfeld, supra note 186, at 542, 567.
306. See 49 U.S.C. § 40101 (2012). The measure does not apply to victims who were not in the
airplane or to victims who were flying on "scheduled passenger-carrying operations." General Aviation
Revitalization Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 2(c) (1994).
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direct costs imposed on injured individuals.3 07
In contrast, the National Childhood Vaccine Injury Act of 1986 is a more
expansive effort that combines procedural and substantive limitations on conven-
tional tort remedies with an alternative compensation scheme for probable
victims of covered vaccines. 308 Even the "essential health benefits" specified
under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 begin to resemble
some of the most basic elements of an alternative compensation scheme. 09
Proactive legislation enacted before a product reaches the market might
provide greater certainty without disrupting the expectations of companies and
consumers. To this end, one scholar has called on Congress to quickly "shield
manufacturers and distributors of open robotic platforms from suit for what
consumers do with their personal robots." 3 10 But a proactive approach also has
drawbacks: It presumes a problem that does not yet exist, it invites regulation of
innovation, and it balances the well-aligned interests of buyers and sellers
against those of individual victims who have yet to be identified. Regardless,
the rapid pace of innovation may simply negate an opportunity for proactive
legislative intervention.
Accordingly, rather than prescribe a public-sector solution, this Article de-
scribes a set of potential private-sector strategies for achieving greater technical,
legal, and reputational certainty. The next section turns to the first of these
strategies, which aims to limit the duration of risk.
B. PRIVATE REPOSE
Some industries already have the contractual and technical tools needed to
achieve what is in effect a private statute of repose. Limiting the life of a
product can cut off the long tail of liability that attaches to a product; this may
be particularly attractive when that life would arguably be excessive other-
wise.3 1 1 It may give companies more confidence to experiment by enabling
them to assume risks for only a few years rather than a few decades. And it may
facilitate the kind of perpetual pilot projects or continuous beta releases com-
mon in software development.3 12
The contractual tools of repose include leases and even end-user license
307. This is not to suggest that a single bill must necessarily accomplish all of these aims, some of
which may be better addressed under existing regulatory authorities or social programs.
308. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 300aa-1 to -34 (2012). It also includes a reporting requirement. See id.
309. The Patient Protection & Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, § 1302, 124 Stat. 163
(2010).
310. M. Ryan Calo, Open Robotics, 70 MD. L. REv. 571, 576 (2011).
311. See Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 302, at 1275; see also Bryant Walker Smith, Planning for
the Obsolescence of Technologies Not Yet Invented, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Oct. 4, 2013, 6:50 PM),
http://www.volokh.com/2013/10/04/planning-obsolescence-technologies-yet-invented.
312. See, e.g., Christopher Soghoian, Caught in the Cloud: Privacy, Encryption, and Government
Back Doors in the Web 2.0 Era, 8 J. TELECOMM. & HIGH TECH. L. 359, 417, 417-18 (2010); Andrew
Chadwick, Web 2.0: New Challenges for the Study of E-Democracy in an Era of Informational
Exuberance, 5 I/S: J.L. & POL'Y 9, 22 (2009).
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agreements. Such agreements may permit repossession at the end of the term or
may impose restrictions on where, when, how, by whom, and for what the
product is used.31 General Motors, for example, relied on leasing to introduce
its first modem electric car to California consumers in the late 1990s, an
approach that allowed it to subsequently repossess and crush many of these cars
when it declined to pursue broader commercialization.3 14
The addition of telematics could facilitate the effective private enforce-
ment of these contractual rights. A manufacturer might closely monitor product
use, disable functionality when a violation occurs, and remotely "brick" those
products that are not returned at the end of the term.
In contrast with this vision, the world today is largely one without privately
enforced product retirement. The average age of cars in the United States now
exceeds eleven years315 younger than Google3 16 but older than Facebook. 317
More dramatically, the average age of the general aviation fleet in 2010 was
thirty-seven years,318 the same as the median age of the U.S. population 31 9 and
a full third of the total time that has elapsed since humans achieved powered
flight.320
The experiences of the automotive and general aviation industry suggest why
companies that are now deploying a first generation of complex medical and
consumer devices may not want these products in the world decades later. In
mid-2013, the National Highway Traffic Safety Administration requested that
Chrysler recall two million cars and SUVs, some of which were twenty years
old. 32 1 The lengthier lifespans of small aircraft led in part to the General
313. Alarmingly, the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act may even criminalize a violation of those
terms. See, e.g., Kerr, supra note 52, at 1571-72.
314. See WHo KILLED THE ELECTRIC CAR (Sony Pictures Classics 2006).
315. See Press Release, Polk, Polk Finds Average Age of Light Vehicle Continues to Rise (Aug. 6,
2013), https://www.polk.com/company/news/polk-finds-average-age-oflight-vehicles-continues-to_
rise. The report does not define "average." Id.
316. See Company Overview, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/about/company/ (last visited Sept.
15, 2013).
317. See About Facebook, FACEBOOK, https://www.facebook.com/facebook/info (last visited Sept. 15,
2013).
318. See GEN. AVIATION MFRS. Ass'N, 2012 GENERAL AVIATION STATISTICAL DATABOOK & INDUSTRY
OUTLOOK 36 (2012), available at http://www.gama.aero/files/GAMA7233 ARFINAL_LOWRES.pdf.
This report also does not define "average." Id. Significantly, "pursuant to FAA- and producer-prescribed
periodic maintenance, aircrafts are rebuilt on a periodic basis. Over the lifespan of a general aviation
aircraft, almost every major component will be replaced." H.R. REP. No. 103-525 pt. 2, at 6 (1994). The
same cannot quite be said of humans.
319. See North America: United States, CIA WORLD FACrBOOK, https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/
the-world-factbook/geos/us.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
320. See The Dream of Flight, LIBRARY OF CONG. (July 29, 2010), http://www.loc.gov/exhibits/
treasures/wb-timeline.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
321. See Gabe Nelson, NHTSA Vows Aggressive Stance on Recalls, AUTOMOTIVE NEws (July 15,
2013, 12:01 AM ET), http://www.autonews.com/article/20130715/OEM11/307159906/nhtsa-vows-
aggressive-stance-on-recalls. In that article, NHTSA's administrator also describes the agency's "unrea-
sonable risk" standard as an "evolving notion." Id.
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Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994.322 "Tens of thousands" of these aircraft
"had been sold in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. But by the mid-1980s,
fewer than a thousand planes were sold each year. The cost of those planes had
to cover an ever-growing liability exposure that arose from planes sold in the
distant and very distant past."3 23
This untenable reliance by general aviation manufacturers on a relatively
small number of new sales to cover substantial legacy litigation points to a
second way in which proximity may help manage risk-in this case, dynamically.
C. DYNAMIC RISK MANAGEMENT
As OnStar and other automotive telematics systems have demonstrated,
subscriptions can complement product sales and leases.324 In a world of increas-
ing proximity, they may also be used to dynamically price reasonable risks and
prevent unreasonable ones.
Consider, for example, one possible model for the deployment of advanced
automation in motor vehicles: Although a customer might purchase or lease a
vehicle complete with all of the hardware and at least some of the software
needed for automated driving, she would then pay on a periodic or on-demand
basis to actually use these features. A variety of services-from vehicle telemat-
ics to cellular phones to traditional utilities-already operate this way. Indeed,
similar to pay-as-you-drive insurance, peak calling minutes, and smart meters, a
company might even charge different prices for urban and rural, day and night,
or summer and winter trips.
Such a model may facilitate more precise management of technical risk. An
automaker might restrict advanced features to certain routes, times, or condi-
tions, tailoring these restrictions as it learns more about the actual performance
of its vehicles. And provision of the latest maps and algorithms might simply be
part of the automation package to which the customer subscribes.
This model may also contribute to the management of financial risk. Simplis-
tically,325 a company that obtains all of its revenue from product sales must
either build the cost of all future risk into the selling price of its product or, as
with general aviation, rely on future sales to cover new expenses associated
with past sales. In contrast, a company that supplements sales with subscriptions
might look to future revenue associated with one product to cover future costs
associated with that same product.
A commercial seller may not have complete discretion in discontinuing
support or adjusting prices. The product-service combination can raise antitrust
322. See Schwartz & Lorber, supra note 302, at 1275. Even opponents of GARA appear to have
acknowledged the impressive durability of these aircraft. Id. at 1277 ("[The American Association of
Trial Lawyers] also said that the existing aircraft were of too high a quality, thus contributing to
lengthy, durable and reliable service lives.").
323. Id. at 1275.
324. See supra section I.D.
325. This distinction is not, for example, based on generally accepted accounting principles.
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concerns. 3 2 6 It can also give rise to reliance. After the cellular carriers with
which OnStar contracts completed their transition from analog to digital ser-
vices, for example, OnStar customers whose vehicles were equipped only with
analog hardware sought recovery from the General Motors subsidiary for
breach of contract, misrepresentation, and unfair trade practices.32 7
Although the kinds of dynamic risk management described in this section
assume an underlying sale or lease, such a product-based transaction is not
always necessary. The final section considers this alternative of pure service
transactions.
D. SERVICE MODELS
Finally, in lieu of making individual sales, manufacturers may opt to provide
services to individual users. This section considers both indirect and direct
service models.
First, a manufacturer might sell or lease exclusively to a limited number of
major entities that use its products to provide services to a much larger set of
customers. These service partners would maintain the products, train the users,
and perhaps even indemnify the manufacturer. Partners might include utilities
and other operators of significant facilities like airports, seaports, railways,
highways, pipelines, mines, farms, factories, military bases, logistics centers,
universities, resorts, retirement communities, and medical centers. In the case of
automated vehicles, they may also include large fleet operators like govern-
ments, construction firms, and transportation companies.
A limited number of close relationships with financially stable entities may
help regulate product use and facilitate recovery in the case of harm caused by
misuse. They may also provide a means for manufacturers to cautiously intro-
duce products into the market. The Department of Defense or United States
Postal Service, for example, may be able to provide assurances or adhere to
restrictions that tens of thousands of individual customers could not.
Second, rather than rely on others to put its products to use, a manufacturer
might provide the services itself. Although companies from Boeing328 to Grey-
hound 3 2 9 to Daimler 3 30 have combined particular manufacturing and service
operations in this way, risk management was probably not a significant motiva-
tion. However, this vertical integration could provide a manufacturer greater
326. See, e.g., Thomas H. Au, Note, Anticompetitive Tying and Bundling Arrangements in the
Smariphone Industry, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REv. 188, 190-91 (2012).
327. See, e.g., In re OnStar Contract Litig., 278 F.R.D. 352, 364 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (discussing
discontinuation of OnStar's analog service).
328. See The Boeing Logbook: 1927-1932, BOEING, http://www.boeing.com/boeing/history/
chronology/chronO3.page (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
329. See Greyhound Historical Timeline, GREYHOUND, http://www.greyhound.com/en/about/historical
timeline.aspx (last visited Sept. 15, 2013).
330. See supra section IC.
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control over the use and maintenance of its products.3 3 1
A shift from product to service has specific liability implications, because
strict products liability3 3 2 and the sales provisions of the Uniform Commercial
Code 3 33 generally do not apply to services. Generally, however, this purely legal
distinction is probably a poor basis for strategic business decisions,33 4 particu-
larly because a product sale is likely to take place at some point in a complex
supply chain. Moreover, a product classification may not be categorically
preferable to one side in a tort action. The language of negligence may or may
not make a more favorable impression on a jury. 3 A product classification
could also benefit a plaintiff attempting to invoke a Uniform Commercial Code
remedy, 3 3 6 or it could benefit a defendant seeking the benefit of legislatively
crafted restrictions on product liability.33 7
CONCLUSION
This Article posits a spiral of proximity and liability: Proximity may drive
liability, and liability may drive proximity. This is not a closed system, and the
spiral may spin far off the path that I have suggested. Regardless, the world in
thirty years will undoubtedly look far different than it does now, and many
products that are advanced today will be primitive tomorrow.
Accordingly, a critical question for companies, regulators, and the public is
whether vestiges of an imminent generation of safety-critical products should
remain without modification in the skies, on the roads, and in our homes for
decades to come. Retrospectively answering in the negative will be ineffective,
as traditional product recalls will not achieve perfect turnover.3 38
The characteristics of proximity identified in this Article-information about,
access to, and control over products, users, and uses-provide some of the legal
and technical tools to effectively revise and retire obsolete products. But these
331. Product users employed by the manufacturer may also fall under the worker compensation
regime.
332. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRrs: PRODS. LIAB. § 19 (1998).
333. See U.C.C. § 2-2(a); see also Thomas M. Schehr, Commercial Transactions and Contracts,
46 WAYNE L. REv. 517, 554-55 (2000).
334. See U.C.C. § 2 cmt. f; cf RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTs: PRODS. LIAB. § 20 reporter's note a
(1998) ("When confronted with nonsale situations to which the logic of strict products liability applied,
historically courts tended to stretch the word 'sell' to cover new situations [like commercial product
leases].").
335. See Cupp, supra note 189, at 1097-98.
336. See, e.g., Schehr, supra note 333, at 547, 554-55.
337. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF ToRTs: PRODS. LIAB. § 19 reporter's note a (1998).
338. See Only One-Fifth of Americans Are Aware They Purchased a Recalled Product, CONSUMER
REPORTS (Jan. 4, 2011), http://pressroom.consumerreports.org/pressroom/20 11/01/only-one-fifth-of-
americans-are-aware-they-purchased-a-recalled-product.html; Dan Koeppel, Why Product Recalls Make
You Less Safe, POPULAR MECHANICS (June 21, 2012, 6:30 AM), http://www.popularmechanics.com/
technology/gadgets/news/why-product-recalls-make-you-less-safe-8347658; Survey: Consumer Confu-
sion over Car Recalls, CONSUMER REPORrs (May 21, 2012, 10:12 AM), http://www.consumer reports.org/
cro/news/2010/05/survey-consumer-confusion-over-car-recalls/index.htm.
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tools also have risks. This Article has examined some of the legal challenges
and opportunities that proximity presents for sellers. For individuals, these tools
also raise concerns about privacy and autonomy as against companies, govern-
ments, and malicious actors.
For example, technical connectivity, especially over-the-air updates, can
make products more robust, but it can also make them less secure. The troubling
vulnerability of many current medical deviceS339 demonstrates that careful
design of product and network architectures is imperative. Legal regimes can
support this design by clarifying rights and responsibilities with respect to
information, access, and control.
Tort law, contract law, and the hybrid that is products liability will confront
some of the failures of this design. As this Article has argued, the result could be
expanded duties for sellers. NBCUniversal runs a series of public service
announcements under the ominously incomplete parallelism "The More You
Know."34 0 Sellers know more, they may do more, and law may require more.
339. See, e.g., Content of Premarket Submissions for Management of Cybersecurity in Medical
Devices, 78 Fed. Reg. 35,940 (proposed June 14, 2010); NAT'L CYBERSECURITY & COMMC'NS INTEGRA-
TION CTR., DEP'T OF HOMELAND SEC., BULLETIN No. 201205040900, ATrACK SURFACE: HEALTHCARE AND
PUBLIc HEALTH SECIOR (2012).
340. The More You Know, COMCAST NBCUNIVERSAL, http://www.themoreyouknow.com (last visited
Sept. 15, 2013).
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